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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL:
PARAMETERS AND BEST PRACTICES
Recent developments, including calls (to date unheeded) for the U.N.
Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International
Criminal Court (ICC or the Court), the referral of the situations in
Sudan and Libya to the ICC, as well as various demands that the
Security Council use its deferral powers under the ICC’s Rome
Statute,1 highlight the importance of the relationship between the
Security Council and the ICC. The Security Council (a political body)
has sway over the docket of the ICC (a judicial institution) – the
power to refer situations’ over which the ICC would not otherwise
have jurisdiction, and to defer investigations and prosecutions. While
many states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have de-
cried (and some continue to decry) the Security Council’s role vis-a`-
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vis the ICC,2 it clearly exists under the ICC’s Rome Statute. Thus, the
more productive inquiry is to examine what legal parameters guide
this relationship, and what additional considerations should be rele-
vant to deﬁning the proper interaction between these institutions.
This article, which follows on two interesting seminars that ex-
plored these issues,3 will examine the relationship between the
Security Council and ICC. Part one lays out the basic parameters as
to when the Security Council may make referrals, and examines
whether there is any legal obligation for the Security Council to make
referrals in the face of mass atrocity crimes. Part two lays out the
basic parameters as to when the Security Council may defer ICC
investigations and/or prosecutions. These parts also examine the
referrals and deferrals made to date, and proposals for referrals and
deferrals that have been made. Part three examines the language used
in Security Council referral resolutions. Speciﬁcally, it considers
language used in the two referral resolutions to date – Security
Council Resolution 1593 (Darfur)4 and Security Council Resolution
1970 (Libya)5 – that (a) excludes use of U.N. funds to pay for
investigation and prosecution of the referred situations, (b) excludes
nationals from non-ICC States Parties from ICC jurisdiction that
would otherwise follow from referral of the situation,’ and (c) only
imposes cooperation obligations on the states covered by the refer-
rals. Finally, part four explores whether some mechanism should be
implemented so the Security Council, as a regular matter, conducts
2 For one such critique, see E. Jiminez, Seeking Global Reform: The United
Nations Security Council, The International Criminal Court, and Emerging Nations’
(2012) 30Macalester International 84, at 85 (the interaction between the ICC and the
Security Council undermines global justice and maintains the current delegitimized
dominant order’); ibid. at 86 (the ICC’s lack of total independence from politici-
zation as well as statutory limitations threatens its primary objective of protecting
individuals from abuse of power.’).
3 The ﬁrst meeting took place on 16 March 2012, at Chatham House in the U.K.,
and was sponsored by Parliamentarians for Global Action and Chatham House. The
second took place on 8 November 2012, at the International Peace Institute in New
York City and was sponsored by the Liechtenstein Mission to the U.N. and the
International Peace Institute.
4 Resolution 1593 – Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1593 (2005) (hereinafter, Resolution 1593’).
5 Resolution 1970 – Peace and Security in Africa, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011)
(hereinafter, Resolution 1970’).
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follow-up as to its referrals. The article concludes both that there are
limited, but signiﬁcant, legal parameters to guide interaction of the
Security Council and ICC, and attempts to make a number of best
practice recommendations. It also concludes that the Security
Council should (a) not include in the referral resolution language that
no U.N. funding accompany the referral; (b) not include language
that purports to exempt nationals of non ICC-States Parties from
referral of a situation’; (c) mandate that all U.N. Member States
cooperate regarding any referral; and (d) create some kind of follow-
up mechanism when it makes a referral in order to help ensure suc-
cessful investigations and prosecutions. (A summary of this article’s
conclusions is located in Appendix A hereto.)
I. LEGAL PARAMETERS AS TO WHEN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL MAKES A REFERRAL
Under theRome Statute, the Security Council may refer a situation’ to
the ICC’s Prosecutor.6 Unlike referrals by States Parties and the
Prosecutor acting under his or her proprio motu power, both of which
additionally require jurisdiction to otherwise exist through a state’s
ratiﬁcation of, or accession to, the Rome Statute, Security Council
referral is extremely signiﬁcant because it also creates jurisdiction.7 As
explained below, when the Security Council may refer a situation’ to
the ICC is governed by both the Rome Statute, and also the U.N.
Charter. Whether the Security Council has any obligation to make
referrals is governed by theU.N. Charter, andmore recently, informed
by the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect.’
6 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 13(b).
7 If the Court is acting after State Party referral or Prosecutor referral, the pro-
visions of Article 12(2)(a) or (b) must be met for jurisdiction to exist. Rome Statute,
Article 12(2) states:
In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) [State Party referral] or (c) [Prosecutor
referral], the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following
States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in
accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if
the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of regis-
tration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 12(2). Signiﬁcantly, in the case of Security
Council referral under Article 13(b), there is no similar jurisdictional requirement.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Arts. 12–13.
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1.1 Requirements for Security Council Referral




The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article
5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
… (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations….8
From the face of this provision, at least three aspects are note-
worthy: (1) in terms of a threshold for action, the Security Council
may act when one or more’ ICC crimes appears to have been
committed,’ and (2) in making the referral, the Security Council
must be acting under Chapter VII’ of the U.N. Charter, but (3) even
when both these conditions are met, the Court’s independence is
preserved in that it may exercise its jurisdiction,’ but is not man-
dated to do so.
As to the threshold for action of one or more’ ICC crimes, at ﬁrst
blush, that could suggest a somewhat low threshold. One murder in the
proper context arguably can constitute a crime against humanity.9 Yet,
the context (or chapeau) requires a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’10
committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy.’11 This context necessarily requires fairly large-scale crimes to be
occurring. Similarly, while Article 8 of the Rome Statute permits an
isolatedwar crime to constitute a crime, it also suggests theCourt should
exercise jurisdiction in particular when [war crimes are] committed as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
8 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 13(b) (emphasis added).
9 See J. Trahan, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Digest of
the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2010), at 90
(compiling cases); J. Trahan, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A
Topical Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (2006), at 216–217 (compiling cases).
10 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 7(1).
11 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 7(2)(a).
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crimes.’12 Again, this suggests that the Court should act primarily as to
large-scale war crimes. Genocide necessarily is almost always a large-
scale crime as it requires intent to destroy, in whole or in part,’13 a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.’14 Additionally, the
Rome Statute’s preamble makes clear that the ICC is to prosecute the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole.’15 Thus, the threshold of one or more’ ICC crimes is not really
that low. Furthermore, one probably need not fear that the Security
Council will act after only one ICC crimes appears to have been com-
mitted. If anything, practice to date shows that non-action or late-action
is probablymore of a concern.16 Furthermore,were the SecurityCouncil
12 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 8(1).
13 The in part’ requirement has been read by at least the ICTYand ICTR to require a
substantial part’ of the group be targeted. See Trahan, supra note 9, ICTR Digest, at
27–28; Trahan, supra note 9, ICTY Digest, at 158–163 (collecting cases on the sub-
stantial’ part requirement). Because incitement’ is a mode of responsibility, it theo-
retically would be possible to incite genocide without large-scale killing occurring, see
Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 25.3(e) (incitement as to genocide); that would,
however,make a fairlyweak ICCcase andmight not passArticle 17’s gravity threshold.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 17 (gravity as a criterion of admissibility).
14 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 6.
15 Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamble. See 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 1155U.N.T.S. 331, Art. 31.2 (The context for the purpose of the interpretation
of a treaty shall comprise in addition to the text,… its preamble and annexes….’).
16 See L. Moss, The UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court:
Towards a More Principled Relationship’, 2012 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1, at 12 (li-
brary.fes.de/pdf-ﬁles/iez/08948.pdf) (the problem of Security Council referrals con-
tinues to be under-inclusiveness rather than over-inclusiveness’). The Darfur referral
occurred only after hundreds of thousands of fatalities. J.E. Tangaho and J.P. Her-
mina, The International Community Responds to Darfur: ICC Prosecution Renews
Hope for International Justice’ (2008–2009) 6Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 367, at 367–368
(Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and its proxy ArabMilitias, the Janjaweed, have killed
almost 400,000 people.’). To date, there are an estimated 100,000 fatalities in Syria, and
no referral. See D. Evans and O. Holmes, Syria Death Toll Tops 100,000, Rebels Lose
Border Town’, Reuters, 26 June 2013. There were also calls (unheeded) for referral of
the situation in Sri Lanka after large-scale war crimes were suspected of having been
committed by both government forces and members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (the LTTE’). See Rep. of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on
Accountability in Sri Lanka (31 March 2011), at 49–51 (www.un.org/News/dh/
infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf) (preliminarily concluding that war crimes
were committed by both the government of Sri Lanka (shelling no ﬁre zones, a United
Nations hub, and hospitals, depriving civilians in conﬂict zones of humanitarian aid,
and rape, torture and disappearances of suspected LTTE members) and the LTTE
(taking civilians as hostages, using civilians as human shields, executing civilians who
attempted to ﬂee conﬂict zones, forced recruitment of children, forced labor, killing
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to act prematurely, the Prosecutor would have discretion not to proceed
in any event.17 As to whether Rome Statute crimes have occurred, the
Security Council has the option of relying on U.N. Secretary-General
reporting to the SecurityCouncil or aCommissionof Inquiry report, but
is not required to do so, or wait for such reporting before it acts.
The second requirement for Security Council referral is that the
Security Council act under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.18 This
imposes an additional threshold in that Chapter VII action is only
permissible under the U.N. Charter where Article 39 has been met,
that is, there has been a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of
aggression.’19 Thus, for example, commission of an isolated war
crime (unless particularly large-scale), might not involve a threat to
the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.’ It is only when
Article 39 is additionally met, that the Security Council may act. (Of
course, whether the Security Council is acting under Chapter VII’ is
a question for the Council initially to decide upon,20 and the Council
Footnote 16 continued
civilians through suicide bombings, and using military equipment near civilians or
civilian installations like hospitals)).
17 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 53.1(c) (considerations for determining
whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation).
18 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 13(b). This requirement is found in the Rome
Statute, but independently also exists in the U.N. Charter, for the Security Council
to be able to act under Chapter VII.
19 U.N. Charter, Art. 39. See also A. Mokhtar, The Fine Art of Arm-Twisting:
The US, Resolution 1422 and Security Council Deferral Power Under the Rome
Statute’ (2003) 3 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 295, at 311 (UN Charter article 39… refers to a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression as a prerequisite for
action by the [Security Council under Chapter VII].’).
20 R. Lavalle, A Vicious Storm in a Teacup: The Action by the United Nations
Security Council to Narrow the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’
(2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 195, at 201. See also J. Stromseth, D. Wippman, and
R. Brooks, Can Might Make Right?: Building the Rule of Law After Military Inter-
ventions (2006), at 23 ([T]he Charter does not limit or deﬁne these terms [threat to
the peace/breach of the peace/act of aggression], leaving to the Security Council the
ﬂexibility to make these determinations in concrete circumstances.’). For discussion
of whether the Council’s action is subject to judicial review, see n. 93.
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appears to make fairly liberal calls in this respect, sometimes recog-
nizing that internal conditions within a country’ could potentially
pose a threat to peace and security.’21)
The thirdkeyparameterwe see fromArticle 13(b) is that theCourt is not
required to act after Security Council referral but may exercise its juris-
diction,’22 making clear the Court must evaluate for itself whether the
proper criteria to move forward are met. Under the Rome Statute,
regardless of how a situation is referred – that is, including if there is a
Security Council referral – the Prosecutor undertakes a preliminary exam-
ination.23 As the OTP’s Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations
makes clear: no automaticity is assumed whether the Prosecutor receives a
referral fromaStatePartyor theUNSecurityCouncil.’24Pursuant toArticle
53(1)(a)–(c), the Prosecutor evaluates whether there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation’ by considering (a) jurisdiction; (b) admissi-
bility (complementarity and gravity); and (c) the interests of justice.’25 If
these criteria are notmet, the Prosecutor determines there is no reasonable
21 See Stromseth, supra note 20, at 24, n. 11 (The discussion regarding Article 2(7)
at San Francisco in 1945 revealed considerable awareness that internal conditions
within a country, including grievous violations of human rights, could potentially
pose a threat to peace and security and thus give rise to enforcement action by the
United Nations.’); ibid., at 32 (UN-authorized interventions in the 1990s demon-
strated the Security Council’s willingness to deﬁne threats to the peace’ more
broadly and ﬂexibly than ever before… invoking reasons for intervention that went
well beyond aggression or classic cross-border threats to peace and security.’).
22 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 13(b) (emphasis added). Article 53, by contrast,
contains language that suggestsmore of a presumption that the Prosecutorwill open an
investigation upon State Party or Security Council referral. Compare Rome Statute,
supra note 1, Art. 53(1) (The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made
available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is
no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute.’) (emphasis added).
23 See ICC Oﬃce of the Prosecutor, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examina-
tions’, 2010, at para. 2 (www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9FF1EAA1-41C4-4A30-A202-
174B18DA923C/282515/OTP_Draftpolicypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101.pdf)
(the Oﬃce [of the Prosecutor] conducts a preliminary examination of all situations
brought to its attention based on statutory criteria and the information available’);
ibid., at para. 4 (The preliminary examination of a situation may be initiated by: (a) a
decision of the Prosecutor… (b) a referral from a State Party or the Security Council; or
(c) a declaration pursuant to article 12(3)….’) (emphasis added) (hereinafter Draft
OTP Policy Paper’).
24 Ibid., at para. 28 (emphasis added).
25 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 53(1); Draft OTP Draft Policy Paper, supra
note 23, at para. 5.
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basis to proceed.’26 The Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision by the
Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation.’27 The Prosecutor’s deci-
sion-making ability vis-a`-vis whether to initiate an investigation and Pre-
Trial Chamber review is extremely important in the event of Security
Council referral to help ensure the ICC’s independence from the Security
Council.28TheSecurityCouncil cannotmake theProsecutoract in theevent
of a referral. He or she must independently conclude that there is a rea-
sonable basis to proceed.
1.2 Whether There is any Legal Requirement to Make a Referral
A separate question is whether there is ever an obligation for the Security
Council tomake a referral, for instance, in the face of grave atrocity crimes.
First, it is signiﬁcant to note that the Rome Statute imposes no such
obligation on the SecurityCouncil to act, nor could it.29While theRome
Statute governs referrals, it cannot ultimately empower or mandate the
Security Council to do anything that it could not otherwise do under the
26 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 53(1). If the determination that there is no
reasonable basis to proceed’ is based solely on consideration of the interests of
justice,’ the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.’ Ibid.
27 Draft OTP Policy Paper, supra note 23, at para. 98. Such review may be re-
quested by the referring party, i.e. either the State Party concerned or the Security
Council, or, where the Prosecutor’s decision is based solely on decision the [sic]
interests of justice, on the Pre-Trial Chamber’s own initiative.’ Ibid., at n. 67; Rome
Statute, supra note 1, Art. 53(3).
28 SeeM.ElZeidy, TheUnitedStatesDropped theAtomicBombofArticle 16of the
ICC Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422’ (2002) 35
Vand. J. of Transnat. L. 1503, at 1516 (even in the event of Security Council referral
under Article 13(b) [t]he prosecutor has wide discretion and can decide not to proceed
in accordance with Article 53[;] [t]hus, the prosecutor and the ICC can block the
Security Council’s referral.’); Negotiated Relationship Agreement Between the Inter-
national Criminal Court and the United Nations (2004), at pmbl. para. 4 (hereinafter,
Negotiated Relationship Agreement’) (stressing that the ICC is established as an
independent permanent institution.’); ibid., at Art. 2 (The United Nations recognizes
the Court as an independent permanent judicial institution which… has international
legal personality and such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions and the fulﬁllment of its purposes.’); Draft OTP Policy Paper, supra note 23,
at para. 34 (Article 42 of the Statute provides that the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor shall act
independently of instructions from any external source’).
29 The Council is not bound by the provisions of the Rome Statute. Its author-
ity… must… be assessed on the basis of its Chapter VII powers under the Charter.’
C. Stahn, The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002)’ (2003) 14
European J. of Int’l L., at 97; see also Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 311 (Under Article
16, the source of the [Security Council’s] power to defer proceedings before the ICC
clearly derives from Chapter VII of the UN Charter.’).
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U.N. Charter (which creates Security Council powers and obligations).
Put anotherway, theRomeStatute is instructing the ICCProsecutorand
Judges what to do if the Security Council makes a referral. The Charter,
by contrast, only grants the Security Council power vis-a`-vis U.N.
Member States.30 The Rome Statute could not permit or mandate the
Security Council to do something vis-a`-vis the ICC if the Security
Council did not already have that power (or obligation) to begin with
under the U.N. Charter.
TheU.N.Charter also does not expresslymandate action in the face
of grave crimes, although it suggests it. The Charter makes clear that
one of the purposes and principles of the U.N. is promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights,’31 and that Chapter VII action
(which could include action to protect human rights) would not con-
stitute aCharter violation as SecurityCouncil actionmust be consistent
with the purposes of the U.N. Charter.32 Yet, even if Chapter VII is
triggeredby anArticle 39 threat to the peace, breachof the peace, or act
of aggression’ (which well may be met if large-scale atrocity crimes are
occurring),33 there is not necessarily an express responsibility in the
Charter for the Security Council to act. While Article 39 states that the
Security Council shall make recommendations, or decide what mea-
sures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42’ if there is a
30 SeeU.N.Charter,Art. 25 (TheMembers of theUnitedNations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.’);
N. Jain, ASeparate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and
the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 16 E.J.I.L. 239, at 253 (an international
organization like the ICC has a separate legal personality independent of its Member
States. Under Article 25 of the U.N. Charter, mandatory [Security Council] resolutions
only create binding obligations for states, and not for international organizations con-
stituted by these states.’).
31 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 1.3.
32 See E. Rosand, The Security Council as ‘‘Global Legislator’’: Ultra Vires or Ultra
Innovative?’ (2004) 28 Fordham Int’l L. J., at 556. See alsoU.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art.
2(7) (Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state…; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’).
33 See Chatham House, International Law Meeting Summary, with Parliamen-
tarians for Global Action, The UN Security Council and The International Criminal
Court’ (16 March 2012), at 18 (Where there are credible reports that core crimes
under international law are being committed, and that those crimes appear to meet
the thresholds for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, this in itself could
indicate to the Security Council that the situation in hand constitutes a threat to
international peace and security.’).
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threat to international peace and security,34 the articles themselves use
the weaker verb, that the SecurityCouncil may’ act. Thus, inArticle 40
(provisional measures), the Security Council may… call upon the
parties concerned to comply with… provisional measures….’35 In
Article 41 (non-forceful means), the Security Council may decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed….’36
And, in Article 42 (forceful measures), the Security Council may take
such actionby air, sea, or land forces asmaybenecessary tomaintain or
restore international peace and security.’37 While the Charter gives the
Security Council primary responsibility’ to protect international peace
and security,38 and states that it has a duty’ to maintain international
peace and security,39 both of which provisions suggest the Security
Council should act where there is a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression,’ themore speciﬁc provisions of Articles 40–
42 suggest that there is no requirement that particular measures be
taken, nor is there an absolute requirement that measures be taken.
Yet, today, one would not read the U.N. Charter in isolation. The
doctrine of the responsibility to protect’ has evolved subsequent to the
drafting of both the U.N. Charter and the Rome Statute. Under this
doctrine, the international community does have a responsibility to
protect a people in peril in certain circumstances. Speciﬁcally, as for-
mulated in a January 2009 Report on Implementing the Responsibility
to Protect, the U.N. Secretary-General identiﬁed three pillars’ to
implement.40 Pillar I emphasizes that states have the primary respon-
sibility to protect their own populations. Pillar II focuses on the
responsibility of the international community to assist states in build-
ing capacity to protect their populations. Pillar III stresses the
responsibility of the international community to take timely and
decisive action to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing,41war crimes, and
34 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 39 (emphasis added).
35 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 40 (emphasis added).
36 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 41 (emphasis added).
37 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 42 (emphasis added).
38 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 24 (1).
39 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 24 (2).
40 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General, U.N.
Doc.A/63/677 (12 January 2009) (hereinafter Implementing theResponsibility to Protect’).
41 Ethnic cleansing’ is not a crime per se under any of the tribunal statutes, but pre-
sumably refers to ethnic killing that may or may not constitute genocide. Thus, it can be a
helpful termtodescribe suchkillingwithoutmaking thedeterminationofwhetherornot the
killing rises to the level of genocide. See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra
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crimes against humanity when a state is manifestly failing’ to
protect its population.42 While the responsibility to protect’ has not
formed into a fully hard-law obligation as of yet, it has been rec-
ognized by the Security Council in numerous resolutions,43 and,
inter alia, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.44 This
doctrine, thus suggests that the Security Council actually does have
an emerging legal obligation (and clearly a moral obligation) to act
Footnote 41 continued
note 30, para. 3 (Ethnic cleansing is not a crime in its own right under international
law, but acts of ethnic cleansing may constitute one of the other three crimes.’).
42 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 30. The International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) suggested that while deci-
sions to intervene should be made by the Security Council, if the Council fails to dis-
charge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for
action, concerned statesmay not rule out othermeans tomeet the gravity and urgency of
that situation….’ See Reportof the InternationalCommissionon InterventionandState
Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect’ (2001) International Development Research
Centre, at XIII, para. 3(F). Subsequent formulations, however, make clear that it is the
Security Council that is to act. See, e.g., World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1
(20 September 2005), at para. 139 ([w]e are prepared to take collective action, in a timely
and decisive manner, through the Security Council….’) (emphasis added).
43 See U.N. Doc. S/RES/1653 (Great Lakes region); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674
(protection of civilians); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (protection of civilians); U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1970 (Libya); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Libya); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Coˆte
d’Ivoire); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1996 (South Sudan); U.N. Doc. S/RES/2014 (Yemen);
U.N. Doc. S/RES/2016 (Libya); U.N. Doc. S/RES/2040 (Libya); U.N. Doc. S/RES/
2085 (Mali). The responsibility of a state to prevent genocide was also upheld re-
cently by the International Court of Justice in the Bosnia v. Serbia case. See Appli-
cation of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, [2007] I.C.J., at 43,
para. 165 (Article I [of the Genocide Convention] does impose distinct obligations
over and above those imposed by other Articles of the Convention. In particular, the
Contracting Parties have a direct obligation to prevent genocide.’).
44 WorldSummitOutcome,U.N.Doc.A/60/L.1 (20September2005), at paras. 138–139.
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in the face of large-scale atrocity crimes.45 Referral to the ICC as
the sole response arguably would be a weak, and not necessarily
suﬃcient, form of action,46 but could be useful, particularly if made
early or mid-way through the commission of the crimes, in order to
attempt to deter further crimes.47 Various states have also proposed
that one Permanent Member of the Security Council, acting alone,
should not prevent action in the face of mass atrocity through use
of its veto power.48
45 See A. Peters, The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect’, 2011 International
Organizations Law Review 8, at 15–16 (www.ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/7561/20111
011154344_4e94481005a88.pdf) (If R2P is a legal or at least nascent legal principle, then
the Security Council’s duty to take suﬃciently robust action in an R2P situation is not
only a moral duty… but a legal one’); but see P. Asikainen and I. O¨sterdahl, The
Responsibility to Protect of the International Community: A Study on the Protection
Duties of the United Nations and Its Member States’ (2011) Uppsala University, at 64
(www.uppsalajuristernasalumnistiftelse.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2011_paivi.
pdf) (As long as there are no clear legal rules imposing on the U.N. an obligation to
prevent genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the Security Council’s
responsibility to protect can only be moral or political in nature.’) (emphases in origi-
nal).
46 See, e.g., R. Cryer, Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice’
(2006) 19 Leiden J. of Int’l L. 195, at 222 ([Referring] the [Darfur] matter to the ICC
does mean that the Security Council is doing something, but other ways of limiting the
conﬂict in Darfur are not being pursued as rigorously as they ought to be…. Therefore
the referring of the matter to the ICC may be seen as stationing an ambulance at the
bottomof a cliﬀ, rather than erecting a fence at the top. Prevention is better than cure.’).
47 While one hopes to deter crimes by the use of referrals, admittedly, it is diﬃcult to
prove that deterrence in fact works. SeeMoss, supra note 16, at 6 (There is much debate
whether the referral of the Darfur situation has had any eﬀect in deterring further
violations of human rights and humanitarian law’); ibid., at 10 (There is again room for
debate as towhether the referral ofLibya had any deterrent eﬀect’). To the extent there is
a deterrent value derived from referrals, consistency in the making of referrals could
enhance the deterrent value.’ Ibid., at 13.
48 See Enhancing the Accountability, Transparency and Eﬀectiveness of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/66/L.42/Rev.2 (2012), at Annex, para. 20 (tabled by
Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland) (recommending that
the Permanent Members of the Security Council refrain from using a veto to block
Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity.’); see also Citizens for Global Solutions, The Responsibility Not
To Veto: A Way Forward’ (2010) (http://globalsolutions.org/ﬁles/public/documents/
RN2V_White_Paper_CGS.pdf).
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1.3 Security Council Referrals to Date and Proposed Referrals
As noted above, to date, the Security Council has twice referred
situations to the ICC: the situation in Darfur, Sudan by Security
Council Resolution 159349 and the situation in Libya by Security
Council Resolution 1970.50
These referrals appear to pose no problem in terms of the legal
parameters discussed above. Certainly the Security Council’s referral
of the situation in Darfur, where the fatality estimates were in the
hundreds of thousands, with millions having been displaced,51 met
the Rome Statute Article 13(b) threshold of one or more’ ICC crimes
appearing to have been committed.’ It would also satisfy the Article
17(1)(d) gravity threshold that, pursuant to Article 53(1)(c), the
Prosecutor is to consider in determining whether there is a reasonable
basis to proceed with an investigation.52 The Libya situation might
pose more questions in this respect, in that at the time of the referral
the crimes were just starting.53 While that may be the best time to
deter crimes, and would satisfy the Article 13(b) language that one or
more [ICC] crimes appears to have been committed,’ the referral
should also consider the ICC’s role to prosecute the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,’54 and
that the ICC gravity threshold must additional by satisﬁed for the
Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation and for the case to be
49 Resolution 1593, supra note 4.
50 Resolution 1970, supra note 5.
51 Tangaho, supra note 16, at 367–368 (Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and its
proxy Arab Militias, the Janjaweed, have killed almost 400,000 people…. In addition
to the murders, almost 2.5 million people [were] displaced.’).
52 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Arts. 17(1)(d) and 53(1)(c). For a discussion of
the appropriate criteria for evaluating gravity under the Rome Statute, see, e.g.,
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-169, 13 July 2006,
Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I
entitled Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article
58’, paras. 69–82 (hereinafter Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’).
53 J. Liolos, Justice for Tyrants: International Criminal Court Warrants for
Gaddaﬁ Regime Crimes’ (2012) 35 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 589, at 592–594 (By
late February 2011, the popular protests in Libya became widespread and promi-
nent; in response, the Gaddaﬁ regime escalated its brutal crackdown on protestors….
[O]n February 26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1970
that unanimously referred the Gaddaﬁ matter to the ICC.’).
54 Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamble.
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admissible.55 Given the crimes covered by the ICC’s two warrants for
crimes committed in Libya,56 these requirements appear met in the
Libya scenario as well.57 In Resolutions 1593 and 1970, the Security
Council also stated that it was acting under Chapter VII,58 and there
does not appear reason to question that Chapter VII was properly
invoked as each situation most likely did constitute a threat to the
peace, [or] breach of the peace.’59
More signiﬁcantly for current events, as explained above, the
responsibility to protect doctrine’ suggests that the Security Council
may actually have an increasingly solidifying obligation to act where
there are large-scale instances of genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity.60 This suggests that the Syria referral (which at the
time of the writing of this article had not occurred despite an esti-
mated 100,000 fatalities,61 and evidence of war crimes and crimes
against humanity62) is not only long-overdue, but referral could
55 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 53(1)(c) (gravity as a criterion for pro-
ceeding with an investigation); Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 17(1)(d) (gravity as a
criterion of admissibility).
56 Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ and Abdullah Al-Senussi stand accused of murder and
persecution as crimes against humanity. See TheProsecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ
and Abdullah Al-Senussi [27 June 2011], Warrant of Arrest. The case against Mu-
ammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddaﬁ (Muammar Gaddaﬁ) was terminated
subsequent to his death.
57 One author argues:
[T]here was evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes at the time the
Council acted. Libyan security forces opened ﬁre on peaceful protestors in Tripoli
and in the eastern city of Benghazi, killing at least 300 people. Gadhaﬁ himself
manifested criminal intent in suppressing the protestors, calling on his supporters
to attack them in their lairs,’ and promising to ﬁght to my last drop of blood.’
Moss, supra note 16, at 8.
58 Resolution 1593, supra note 4, at pmbl., para. 6; Resolution 1970, supra note 5,
pmbl., para. 16.
59 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 39. For discussion of whether there may be
judicial review of the Security Council’s invocation of Chapter VII, see n. 93.
60 See Part 1.2 supra.
61 D. Evans and O. Holmes, Syria Death Toll Tops 100,000, Rebels Lose Border
Town’, Reuters, 26 June 2013. The U.N. has estimated over 92,000 fatalities as of the
end of April. D. Jolly, Death Toll in Syrian Civil War Near 93,000, U.N. Says’, New
York Times, 13 June 2013.
62 U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/22/59 (5 February 2013), paras. 1, 42–162 (detailing reported instances of
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Syrian crisis); see also
N. Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Rights Oﬃcials Urge Syria War Crimes Charges’, New
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constitute one possible avenue for partly satisfying responsibility to
protect’ obligations. Again, this article does not mean to suggest that
an ICC referral alone is necessarily suﬃcient to satisfy either the
responsibility to protect’ or the Security Council’s obligations to
protect international peace and security; indeed, it probably is not.63
Based on the analysis above, the following conclusions may be
drawn.64 In terms of the minimum number of crimes occurring for
the Security Council to make a referral, Article 13(b) requires only
that one or more ICC crimes appear[] to have been committed.’
This is a fairly low threshold, but of course ICC crimes are fairly
large-scale in themselves, and the purpose of the ICC is also to
prosecute the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole.’65 Thus, the Security Council should prob-
ably not act absent fairly signiﬁcant criminality, assessed either
qualitatively and/or quantitatively.66 While some have suggested a
Footnote 62 continued
York Times, 18 February 2013, at A10 (www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/world/
middleeast/un-rights-panel-says-violence-in-syria-is-mounting.html?_r=0) (Navi
Pillay, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the U.N. Human
Rights Council state that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been com-
mitted in Syria and renew requests that the Syrian crisis should be referred by the
Security Council to the International Criminal Court).
63 See Moss, supra note 16, at 1 (arguing that as to the situation in Darfur, referral
was no substitute for the Council’s use of other measures to restore peace and
security.’); ibid., at 5 (The Council can be faulted for not taking adequate measures
to directly address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, but not for lacking an adequate
factual basis and credible process for making the referral to the ICC. The roughly
2,000 African Union (AU) soldiers then on the ground were clearly insuﬃcient to
stop the killing and displacements, and the Council imposed no sanctions or punitive
measures of any kind against the Sudanese government.’).
64 These conclusions are also summarized in Appendix A hereto.
65 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at preamble.
66 See Draft OTP Policy Paper, supra note 23, at paras. 67–70 (suggesting that
gravity encompass both quantitative and qualitative considerations,’ including the
scale of the crimes, the nature of the crimes, themanner of commission, and the impact
of the crimes). See also, e.g.,Situation in theDemocratic Republic of theCongo, at paras.
69–82 (discussing gravity). Premature action also might not satisfy the requirement
that the Security Council act under Chapter VII in making the referral.
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Security Council referral should not occur absent a full commission
of inquiry,67 this author would not necessarily advocate a rigid rule.
The Security Council also may not act unless Chapter VII is addi-
tionally, satisﬁed, that is, there is an actual threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression.’ The SecurityCouncil should also not
wait too late in the day to act, or any deterrent value of the referral will
be lost. In terms of whether the Security Council has any obligation to
make a referral in the face of grave crimes, the relevant legal analysis
should, in addition to the U.N. Charter, also be guided by the
responsibility to protect’ doctrine, which suggests that the Security
Council does indeed have an emerging legal obligation (and certainly a
moral obligation) to act in the face of large-scale atrocity crimes, with
referral constituting one possible step. The Security Council should
also be concerned about showing consistency in making referrals –
using as objective criteria as possible68 – for the sake of its own
67 See Moss, supra note 16, at 9 ([i]n hindsight, it might have been better to allow a
full process of inquiry to establish the facts justifying referral’ of the Libya situation);
see also ibid., at 12 (The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has suggested
possible triggers for a referral might include a resolution of the Human Rights
Council or advice from the ICC Prosecutor, in addition to an international com-
mission of inquiry report, and possibly a role for OHCHR.’).
68 See Moss, supra note 16, at 1 (In using its power of referrals, the Council should
apply criteria and processes that are as objective and consistent as possible’ to
minimize danger to the independence and legitimacy of the ICC,’ so that Council
decisions are not seen as politically motivated’); see also Chatham House, supra note
33, at 4 (It was suggested that the elaboration of criteria would provide civil society
and likeminded states with a set of principles that they could apply in order to put
pressure on the Council to refer situations….’).
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institutional credibility, for the sake of the institutional credibility of
the ICC,69 and for the Security Council to show itself a responsible
actor in the face of large-scale atrocity crimes that threaten interna-
tional peace and security.
II. LEGAL PARAMETERS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S
USE OF ITS DEFERRAL POWERS
Under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council may also
defer’ an ICC investigation or prosecution.’70 To date, the Security
Council has used Article 16 in only one instance – Resolution 1422,
addressing peacekeeping operations,71 and its renewal, in resolution
1487.72 There have additionally been requests for the Security
69 As the U.N. Secretary-General has acknowledged:
[T]here remain serious challenges in pursuing accountability. Some situations
which, by any objective analysis, would have warranted some form of action by
the Security Council, have faced serious obstacles or languished entirely. This has
eroded the Council’s credibility. There is a need to address this problem, and to
bring some consistency to the eﬀort.
U.N. Secretary-General, Honouring Geneva Conventions, Secretary-General Says
Debate No Longer Between Peace And Justice But Between Peace And What Kind
Of Justice’, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/12494, L/T/4417, HR/5002 (26 September 2009)
(http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/857F5A937A9F5F808525763F005C2A9C).
Summarizing a roundtable discussion at the International Peace Institute, it was also
concluded that:
The UN Security Council should apply consistent standards when referring cases
to the ICC, even if this may be diﬃcult to achieve in practice. The Security Council
is a political body, and decisions on situations to be referred to the ICC will
continue to be inﬂuenced by its political nature. But consistency remains an
important goal, because perceptions of the legitimacy and integrity of the ICC
depend on it.
T. Papenfuss, International Peace Institute Meeting Brief, The Relationship Between
the ICC and the Security Council: Challenges and Opportunities,’ at 1, para. 1.
70 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.
71 United Nations Peacekeeping – Resolution 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002)
(hereinafter, Resolution 1422’). Resolution 1422 was adopted by unanimous vote.
72 United Nations Peacekeeping – Resolution 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003)
(hereinafter, Resolution 1487’). Resolution 1487 was adopted by a vote of 12 in
favour with three abstentions – France, German and Syria. Lavalle, supra note 20, at
219, n. 46.
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Council to utilize Article 16: (1) the request by the African Union
(AU) and others that the ICC defer73 the case against Sudanese
President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir against whom the ICC has
issued two arrest warrants;74 and (2) Kenya’s request, supported by
the African Union,75 that the ICC defer the ICC’s investigations and
73 After the ICC applied for a warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir on 14 July 2008, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council
(AU PSC) requested that the U.N. Security Council defer the process initiated by the
ICC in accordance with Rome Statute Article 16 taking into account the need not to
put in jeopardy the ongoing peace eﬀorts, as well as the fact that, in the current
circumstances, a prosecution may not be in the interest of the victims and justice.’
The AU PSC reiterated its deferral request at its 22 September 2008 meeting. The
AU Assembly endorsed the decision of the AU PSC at its 142nd meeting and
expressed its deep concern regarding the warrant. The AU and various African
States Parties to the Rome Statute continued to request a deferral after the ﬁrst
warrant for Bashir was issued on 4 March 2009. S. Weldehaimanot, Arresting Al-
Bashir: The African Union’s Opposition and the Legalities’ (2011) 19 Afr. J. Int’l &
Comp. L. 208, at 214–216. See also Moss, supra note 16, at 7 (The AU Peace &
Security Council and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) both re-
quested that the Security Council suspend prosecution under Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, with support from the Arab League.’).
As to the AU’s argument, an African Union communique´ criticiz[ed] the warrant
request. The communique´ asserted that:
approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the [warrant] application by the ICC
Prosecutor could seriously undermine the ongoing eﬀorts aimed at facilitating the
early resolution of the conﬂict in Darfur and… the Sudan as a whole and, as a
result, may lead to… far-reaching consequences for the country and the region.
Consequently, the AU requested that the Security Council invoke Article 16 to ‘‘defer
the process initiated by the ICC,’’ referring to the Prosecutor’s request that the Pre-
Trial Chamber issue an arrest warrant.’ War Crimes Research Oﬃce, Washington
College of Law, The Relationship Between The International Criminal Court and the
United Nations’ (August 2009), at 22 (www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/
documents/WCRO_Report_on_ICC_and_UN_August2009.pdf) (footnotes omit-
ted).
74 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, First Warrant of Arrest, ICC-
02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009 (hereinafter, Bashir First Arrest Warrant’); The Prose-
cutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Second Warrant of Arrest, ICC-02/05-01/09,
12 July 2010 (hereinafter, Bashir Second Arrest Warrant’).
75 Kenya made eﬀorts to convince other countries that the U.N. Security Council
should defer the Kenyan cases. The African Union supported Kenya’s eﬀorts. The
Kenyan government made a formal deferral request to the U.N. Security Council on
8 February 2011. The Kenyan government stated that because ‘‘some of the indi-
viduals mentioned by the ICC Prosecutor are among the front runner presidential
candidates and the civil servants mentioned are in oﬃce and charged with respon-
sibilities for peace and security,’’ the ICC process poses ‘‘a real and present danger to
the exercise of government and the management of peace and security in the
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prosecutions as to post-election crimes committed in Kenya.76 Ana-
lysis of the legal parameters for utilizing Article 16 suggests that there
are serious questions whether Resolutions 1422 and 1487 were proper
uses of Article 16, and there are substantial questions whether the
proposed deferrals would constitute, or would have constituted,
proper uses of Article 16.
2.1 Requirements for Security Council Deferral
Rome Statute Article 16 states: No investigation or prosecution may be
commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of
12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the
Court to that eﬀect; that request may be renewed by the Council under
the same conditions.’77
From the face of this provision, at least two aspects are note-
worthy: (1) in making the deferral, the Security Council must be
acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; and (2) when it makes
a deferral no ICC investigation or prosecution’ may be commenced
or proceeded with. Because a deferral lasts only 12 months, renewal
would be made under the same terms.78
The requirement that the resolution be adopted under Chapter VII
of theCharter’means that the SecurityCouncilmay not actwithout the
situation ﬁrst triggering the threshold language ofU.N.CharterArticle
39, that there be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.’79 Any renewal after 12 months would have to satisfy the
Footnote 75 continued
country.’’’ T. Hansen, Transitional Justice in Kenya – An Assessment of the
Accountability Process in Light of Domestic Politics and Security Concerns’ (2011–
2012) 42 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 1, at 12–13 (citation omitted).
76 The ICC is slated to go to trial on the cases The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, and The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua
Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11.
77 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 16 (emphasis added).
78 Article 16 does not limit the number of times a deferral request, may be renewed,
which could be read literally to permit inﬁnite renewals.’ El Zeidy, supranote 28, at 1515.
79 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 39. See also Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 311
(Article 39… refers to a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of
aggression as a prerequisite for action by the [Security Council].’).
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same threshold.80 One question that arises is: if the Security Council
purports to act under Chapter VII (it adopts a resolution that states
that it is), does the ICC separately inquire whether the Security Council
properly acted under Chapter VII, or does it simply check that the
resolution says that it did so act? Another question might be: who
provides the threat to the peace,’ and can it be the state or person
asking for, or beneﬁting from, the deferral? In other words, does there
need to be some external threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression’ to which the Security Council is responding, or can, for
instance, the President of Sudan create a threat to the peace’ and
thereby merit deferral of his own prosecution? Neither the Rome
Statute nor the U.N. Charter provides much speciﬁc guidance here.81
As to the requirement that no investigation or prosecution’
be commenced or proceeded with if the deferral is made, one
question that arises is whether the deferral must be of a speciﬁc
investigation or prosecution,’ as Human Rights Watch82 and
80 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 16. To the extent that Resolution 1422 suggests
it will be automatically renewed, see Resolution 1422, supra note 71, para. 2, that
arguably runs roughshod over Article 16’s requirement that a deferral lasts only
12 months. See El Zeidy, supra note 28, at 1525 (suggesting the potentially indeﬁnite
duration of Resolution 1422 was problematic); Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 329 (in-
tent to automatically renew Resolution 1422 violates the letter and the spirit of
Article 16’).
81 These questions are addressed in the next section when considering the validity
of Resolution 1422. Views expressed by a number of states in voting on Resolution
1422 suggest strong disagreement with the resolution, and, particularly, skepticism as
to whether Chapter VII was properly triggered. See Amnesty International, Inter-
national Criminal Court: The unlawful attempt by the Security Council to give US
citizens permanent impunity from international justice’ (May 2003), at 7 (www.
amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/IOR40/006/2003/en/b585efec-d6f8-11dd-b0cc-1f086001
3475/ior400062003en.pdf) (there was overwhelming opposition of states from all
regions and all legal systems [to Resolution 1422].’); ibid., at 17–23, 26–33 (chroni-
cling extensive opposition by many states to Resolution 1422). See also El Zeidy,
supra note 28, at 1519–1523 (most of the Security Council viewed Resolution 1422 as
dangerous and negatively impacting on international law, as well [impacting] on
credibility of the current and future Council decisions’) (chronicling views of various
countries).
82 Human Rights Watch argues:
The phrase, ‘‘no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded
with,’’ presupposes the existence of a particular ‘‘investigation’’ or ‘‘prosecution’’
that relates to a speciﬁc incident or the potential culpability of an individual
regarding speciﬁc conduct. Article 15 of the Rome Statute spells this out. The Pre-
Trial Chamber must authorize the commencement of a speciﬁc ‘‘investigation.’’
All prosecutor inquiries up to this point are not ‘‘investigations,’’ but only
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others83 have argued, or can be made pre-emptively to cover a cat-
egory of potential investigations or prosecutions not yet commenced
at the time of the deferral. Again, the face of Article 16 does not seem
to oﬀer signiﬁcant guidance, although, as explained below, other
Rome Statute provisions may be relevant.84
2.2 Security Council Deferrals to Date
As noted above, there has been only one use, or purported use, of
Article 16 – Resolution 1422, renewed by Resolution 1487. Resolution
1422 states that it grants immunity from ICCprosecution to current or
former oﬃcials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to
the Rome Statute’ related to U.N.-authorized peacekeeping opera-
tions.85 The key operative text of Resolution 1422 is as follows:
The Security Council,…
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that
the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former oﬃcials or personnel from a
contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating
to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month
period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise….86
Footnote 82 continued
‘‘preliminary examinations’’ – see Article 15(6). Only after Pre-Trial Chamber
authorization of an ‘‘investigation’’ is the Security Council entitled to request a
deferral under Article 16.
HumanRightsWatch, The ICC and the Security Council: Resolution 1422, Legal and
Policy Analysis’ (www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/icc/docs/1422legal.htm).
83 See, e.g., Cryer, supra note 46, at 210 (Article 16 covers deferral of particular
investigations or prosecutions’ and not whole categories of individuals).
84 For background on the drafting of Article 16, see M. Bergsmo and J. Pejic´, in O.
Triﬀterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2008), at 595–604; El Zeidy, supra note 28, at
1509–1512; Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 302–306.
85 Resolution 1422, supra note 71, para. 1. Resolution 1422 passed less than two
weeks after the July 2002 activation of the Rome Statute. Lavalle, supra note 20, at
206.
86 Resolution 1422, supra note 71, para. 1. El Zeidy explains that the US insisted
on Resolution 1422 because it did not obtain all its negotiating points during the
ICC’s Rome negotiations. See El Zeidy, supra note 28, at 1507–1508. See also D.
Scheﬀer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals
(2012), chapters 7–8 (chronicling US negotiating points up to and during the Rome
Conference).
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The ﬁrst question that might arise is whether there was a
legitimate threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggres-
sion’ that necessitated this resolution – in other words, whether
this was proper Chapter VII action. Some background is in order
here. Prior to passage of Resolution 1422, the U.S., which had
long-standing concerns about the ICC having jurisdiction over its
armed forces, threatened to veto the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), unless US soldiers were granted
immunity from ICC prosecution.87 The crisis was averted by
adoption of Security Council Resolution 1422.’88 A question
therefore exists whether there was in fact a threat to the peace’ or
breach of the peace’ that legitimated Resolution 1422?89 At least
several scholars and others have argued that there was not.90 Was
87 If the Council would not accept the proposal [to grant immunity to US soldiers
in Bosnia and Herzegovina from ICC jurisdiction for one year], then the United
States threatened to use its veto power to stop the renewal of the period of their
mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was to expire on July 15, 2002.’ El Zeidy,
supra note 28, at 1505. See also Amnesty International, supra note 81, at 3 (the only
such threat to the peace reportedly cited during the closed sessions of the Security
Council was the threat by the USA to veto the extension of UNMIBH and other UN
peace-keeping operations.’); Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 313 (The US clearly stated
that, should the SC refuse immunity for its soldiers, it would veto the renewal of the
UNMIBH.’). For additional discussion of the US position on the ICC, see Part 3.2
infra.
88 Lavalle, supra note 20, at 195–196. See also Stahn, supra note 29, at 85 (This
compromise [Resolution 1422] dissolved the threat of a US veto against future
United Nations peacekeeping operations…. Furthermore, it represents a signiﬁcant
retreat from the initial US demand for permanent immunity of US military personnel
within the framework of peacekeeping operations.’).
89 The Security Council never made this determination [that Article 39 was trig-
gered] in resolution 1422.’ Human Rights Watch, supra note 82.
90 See Stahn, supra note 29, at 104 (The Council stretched its Chapter VII powers
to its utmost limits when treating the issue of the immunity of peacekeepers as a
matter of international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter.’); Lavalle,
supra note 20, at 209 (Resolution 1422 is unconstitutional’ because the resolution
contained no determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression’ and there would have been no factual basis for such a determination);
Amnesty International, supra note 81, at 1 (the Security Council did not even at-
tempt to determine that there was a threat to or breach of international peace and
security. Indeed, it could not have done so since there simply was no such threat.’);
Amnesty International, supra note 81, at 19 (remarks of Switzerland one cannot
really see that the fact that the Court is able to exercise its jurisdiction over the
members of a peace-keeping operation would be a threat to peace.’).
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a threat to future peacekeeping operations a threat to the peace’?91
Or was the threat to the UN’s future ability to respond to de-
mands for peacekeeping, and not a real threat to the peace’?92
Thus, there does seem reason to question whether Chapter VII was
properly invoked (and therefore whether the ﬁrst criterion for
Article 16 deferral was met). Yet, should the ICC sit in judgment
of the Security Council and evaluate such issues?93 Or does Article
91 See, e.g., El Zeidy, supra note 28, at 1524 (The Council could probably witness
that impeding the contribution of peacekeepers by any means, including judicial
interference, might harm the Council’s eﬀorts to maintain international peace and
security. This conclusion might be acceptable, particularly in light of the over-
whelming international support to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina.’). On balance, El
Zeidy, however, ﬁnds Resolution 1422 inﬁrm for a variety of reasons. See El Zeidy,
supra note 28, at 1540, 1544 (concluding that Resolution 1422 is ultra vires: it
conﬂicts with international law principles engrained in the UN Charter, the Law of
Treaties, and certain customary and peremptory norms.’).
92 See Lavalle, supra note 20, at 201, n. 210 (impairing the ability of the United
Nations to respond to threats to the peace is something quite diﬀerent fromcreating such
a threat.’); Stahn, supranote 29, at 87 ([T]he threat to the peace seems to be based less on
the existence of a speciﬁc conﬂict situation than on the potential inability of the United
Nations to address future threats without US military personnel. Such an assumption
raises serious concerns, because it ultimately implies that the non-contribution of troops
to United Nations peacekeeping operations is in itself a threat to the peace.’); Amnesty
International, supra note 81, at 63 (‘‘To assert that a matter may have a distant reper-
cussion on themaintenance of peace is not enough to [justify SecurityCouncil action].’’’)
(quoting Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (SouthWestAfrica) notwithstandingSecurityCouncil Resolution 276, Advisory
Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep. 293, at 340 (separate opinion, Gross. J.).)
93 See, e.g., Lavalle, supra note 20, at 201 (whether the Council is acting under Chapter
VII’ is a question that…only theCouncil candecideupon.’); compareProsecutorv.Tadic,
Appeals Chamber’s Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Juris-
diction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 30 (hereinafter, Tadic’) (ﬁnding
the situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a ‘‘threat to the peace’’); Amnesty
International, supra note 81, at 62 (In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
squarely rejected the decision of the Trial Chamber that the Security Council’s determi-
nation under Article 39 was a nonjusticiable political question that could not be subject to
judicial review.’); Amnesty International, supra note 81, at 65 (Most commentators agree
that Security Council determinations under Article 39, although open to a wide degree of
discretion, are subject to the legal limits that there be a bona ﬁde threat to international
peace and security.’) (citing various sources).
Amnesty International suggests that it is the role of the ICC to decide whether
Article 16 has been properly triggered; thereby, it would not be directly judging
whether the Security Council has properly acted under Chapter VII:
the ICC must be convinced that a decision has been taken that would impose a
requirement underArticle 16 of theRome Statute – not a requirement under theUN
Charter – to defer the investigation or prosecution. The International Criminal
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16 merely require the ICC to check that the resolution invokes
Chapter VII94 and if such language exists, the inquiry is fully
met?95 Furthermore, as a policy matter, as noted above, one might
question whether the person or state creating the threat should be
the beneﬁciary of a deferral that would cover, inter alia, its
nationals? For the Security Council to grant a deferral based on a
threat to international peace and security by a state whose national
would beneﬁt from the deferral could subject the Security Council
Footnote 93 continued
Court – not the Security Council – has the sole responsibility for interpreting this
exceptional statutory provision authorizing the Security Council to request a tem-
porary deferral of an investigation or a prosecution of theworst crimes in theworld.’
Amnesty International, supra note 81, at 36–37; see also ibid., at 39 (it is possible
for the International Criminal Court to assess the compatibility with the Rome
Statute of a request by the Security Council… based solely on the nature of the
request without having to decide the more sensitive question whether the Security
Council exceeded its powers under the UN Charter and other international law.’).
Compare El Zeidy, supra note 28, at 1515 (Professor Schabas stated, ‘‘the [ICC]
could assess whether or not the Council was validly acting pursuant to Chapter
VII.’’’), citing W. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court
(2001), at 66.
94 Resolution 1422 states that the Security Council is acting under Chapter VII, as
does Resolution 1487. See Resolution 1422, supra note 71; Resolution 1487, supra
note 72.
95 For a contrary view, see Amnesty International, supra note 81, at 40 (Of course,
it goes without saying that it is not enough for the Security Council simply to say that
a request was adopted under Chapter VII; such a labelling exercise cannot be
decisive.’).
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to permanent blackmail.’96 One might also argue that a threat by
a permanent member of the Security Council would be particularly
problematic.97
A second question that arises is whether Article 16 only permits
deferral of a speciﬁc investigation’ or prosecution,’ or whether the
deferral may be eﬀective even before there is any such investigation
or prosecution.’ In other words, Resolution 1422 did not defer any
particular investigation or prosecution’ regarding peacekeepers or
oﬃcials from non-States Parties, but acted pre-emptively so that no
such investigation or prosecution could arise. The text of Rome
Statute Article 16 is not entirely clear in this respect, but various
96 A recent Chatham House report explained:
The Security Council may ﬁnd that if it is successfully lobbied by a state under
investigation to make a deferral on the basis that an investigation presents a threat
to international peace and security, then it will be faced with permanent blackmail
by a recalcitrant regime in order to induce the Council to renew the deferral every
twelve months. States could implicitly threaten the Council with recommencing
violence should it decide not to renew a deferral. Not only would this enable
regimes to continually delay the administration of justice, but it would also run
counter to the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Chatham House, supra note 33, at 16. See also K. Roth, Workshop: The Interna-
tional Criminal Court Five Years On: Process or Stagnation?’ (2008) 6 J. Int’l Crim.
Just. 763, at 767 (allowing individuals indicted by the ICC to threaten a refusal to
enter into peace negotiations or to escalate an ongoing conﬂict if the Security
Council does not defer the Prosecution’s proceedings would only encourage other
groups to engage in the same practice’); War Crimes Research Oﬃce, supra note 73,
at 32 (it would appear inconsistent with the purpose of Article 16 to request a
suspension of ICC proceedings in a case where a government is attempting to coerce
a deferral (or a complete amnesty from prosecution) in exchange for disarming or
even engaging in peace negotiations.’).
97 Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 313 (A threat to the peace does not already exist in
such a situation [when Resolution 1422 was adopted]; rather, the US is threatening to
create one.’); see also ibid. (arguing that a U.S. threat is a misuse of the right granted
to it by virtue of Article 27 of the UN Charter’ and breach of the obligation to act in
good faith [as] enshrined in Article 2(2).’); ibid., at 344 (questioning whether a
Permanent Members of the Security Council may use the veto power to threaten
international peace and security’).
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authors have concluded that [t]he drafting history of Article 16
indicates that it was intended to apply to concrete cases.’98
A third question onemight ask as to the validity ofResolutions 1422
and 148799 is whether it is consistent with the Rome Statute to render a
particular category of persons eﬀectively immune from prosecution.
The fact that Article 27 provides that there shall be no exemption from
ICC responsibility for oﬃcial capacity as a Head of State or Govern-
ment, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected represen-
tative or a government oﬃcial’100 suggests that at least those categories
of persons may not be rendered immune based on their capacity. Yet,
98 Lavalle, supra note 20, at 211. ‘‘[T]he negotiating history makes clear that re-
course to article 16 is on a case-by-case basis only, where a particular situation…
warrants a twelve-month delay.’’’ Lavalle, supra note 20, at 211. See also Stahn, supra
note 29, at 89 (Article 16 was negotiated to enable the Council to delay the exercise of
jurisdiction by the ICC in situations in which the resolution of a speciﬁc conﬂict war-
rants a deferral of prosecution.’); ibid. at 90 (Article 16 was certainly not meant to
provide a basis for the immunity of a whole group of actors in advance and irrespective
of any concrete risk of indictment or prosecution.’); Moss, supra note 16, at 4 (These
resolutions [1422 and 1487] were legally dubious, as there was no investigation or
prosecution underway to be ‘‘deferred’’ under Article 16. As David Scheﬀer, the
ClintonAdministration’s lead negotiator in theRome negotiations has written, Article
16 ‘‘was never intended to serve as a generic impunity carve-out for vast categories of
participants in unknown future military operations and atrocity situations.’’’); Am-
nesty International, supra note 81, at 5 (similar). Compare El Zeidy, supra note 28, at
1512 (The ICC Statute does not deﬁne what it considers an ‘‘investigation and pros-
ecution.’’ The statute indicates, however, that an ‘‘investigation’’ involves an action
that may be taken with respect to both a situation or an individual, while a ‘‘prose-
cution’’ involves actions taken with respect only to a speciﬁc person.’).
99 Resolution 1487 was not renewed when it expired after 12 months. See D.
Forsythe, The UN Security Council and Response to Atrocities: International
Criminal Law and the P-5’ (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly 841, at 851 ([P]risoner
abuse at the US-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003, publicized in 2004 ended…
US demands [for further renewal of Resolutions 1422 and 1487].’).
100 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 27 (emphasis added). It continues: Immu-
nities or special procedural rules which may attach to the oﬃcial capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.’ Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 27(2).
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Resolution 1422 does in fact purport to grant immunity, inter alia, to
current or former oﬃcials’ in respect to peacekeeping operations.101
Thus, even assuming the Security Council acted permissibly in passing
Resolutions 1422 and 1487 – as it has extremely broad powers to act
under Chapter VII of the Charter102 – a diﬀerent question is whether
the Prosecutor and Judges (whose actions are governed by the Rome
Statute)103 would recognize the validity of a Security Council resolu-
tion if they view it as inconsistent with Article 27.104
A fourth question as to the validity of Resolutions 1422 and 1487
is whether they conﬂict with the jurisdiction regime of Article 12(2) of
the Rome Statute by establish[ing] a distinction between individuals
from state parties and third states that is not provided for under the
jurisdictional regime of the ICC.’105 Under this reading, the
101 Resolution 1422, supra note 71, para. 1.
102 See, e.g., U.N. Charter, supra note 20, Art. 41 (providing an open-ended list of
permissible Security Council action when non-forcefully responding under Chapter
VII). See also Tadic, supra note 93, para. 39 (Article 39 leaves the choice of means
and their evaluation to the Security Council, which enjoys wide discretionary powers
in [acting under Chapter VII].’); Stromseth, supra note 20, at 23 ([T]he Security
Council’s authority to take action is broad and includes a wide spectrum of potential
responses, from diplomatic measures to economic sanctions to the use of force.’).
103 Article 1 of the Rome Statute states: The jurisdiction and functioning of the
Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.’ Rome Statute, supra note
1, Art. 1. See also Cryer, supra note 46, at 213, n. 96 (The Court, not a member of
the UN… is obliged by Art. 21 of the Rome Statute to apply ‘‘in the ﬁrst place, the
Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.’’’); ibid., at 206
(the ICC, as an independent judicial body, must act according to its Statute.’).
104 Human Rights Watch provides one explanation of why peacekeeper immunity
is inconsistent with the Rome Statute:
Article 27 of the Rome Statue expressly prohibits making distinctions on the basis
of oﬃcial capacity. It is a crucial provision that encompasses the fundamental
object and purpose of the treaty to ensure that no person is above the law. This
includes peacekeepers, as well as politicians and heads of state. Without strict
adherence to this principle, the door to impunity will remain open. In contrast,
Resolution 1422 allows an entire class of individuals to escape judgment of the
ICC, opening the door to impunity if national courts of non-states parties fail to
carry out good faith investigations and prosecutions. It is a clear violation of
Article 27 of the Statute.
Human Rights Watch, supra note 82. See also Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 324
(ﬁnding Resolution 1422 contrary to Article 27 of the Rome Statute).
105 See Stahn, supra note 29, at 93 (arguing that Resolution 1422 conﬂicts with
Rome Statute Article 12(2)). Kevin Jon Heller asks whether the Security Council can
tinker with the Rome Statute in such fundamental ways:
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resolutions represent an unauthorized amendment to the Rome
Statute.106
One possibility is that when a treaty (the Rome Statute) – be it
Article 12(2) (the jurisdictional regime), Article 16 (deferrals), Article
Footnote 105 continued
Could [the Security Council] pass a resolution deferring an ongoing investigation
or prosecution in perpetuity, even though Art. 16 limits the Security Council’s
deferral power to one-year increments? Could it refer a situation to the Court that
took place in the 1970s – some of the worst excesses of the Dirty War, perhaps –
even though the terms of Art. 126 limit the Court’s temporal jurisdiction to ac-
tions that took place after 1 July 2002? Could it deem an aggression prosecution
necessary to protect international peace and security, even though the aggression
amendments are not yet operative?
K.J. Heller, Can the Security Council Implicitly Amend the Rome Statute?’, Opinio
Juris (http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/15/can-the-security-council-implicitly-amend-the-
rome-statute/).
106 One author argues as follows:
The cumulative eﬀect of these resolutions [1422 and 1487] is to carve out an
exception from the Rome Statute for members of non-party states in UN peace-
keeping operations. This exclusion would amount to an amendment to the Rome
Statute and violate the law of treaties under which treaties may be amended only in
the manner provided for in their constitutive instruments.
Jain, supra note 30, at 250. See also El Zeidy, supra note 28, at 1504 (One dominant
theory posits that the adoption of Resolution 1422 delineates the Council’s intent to
augment its powers by amending the International Criminal Court Treaty.’); ibid., at
1523 (The competence of the Council to amend treaties without states’ consent and to
act as a judicial body in order to interpret a provision set out in a treaty is uncertain.’);
Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 328 (To adopt a resolution that turns a provision of a treaty
on its head and gives rise to an eﬀect that was never intended by the drafters is, in eﬀect,
to amend the negotiated terms of that treaty.’);Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 331 (arguing
that an unauthorized amendment is also contrary to Article 18 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties).
It has also been argued that Resolution 1422 conﬂicts with: (i) Rome Statute Article
86, Amnesty International, supra note 81, at 7 and 77; (ii) the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute, Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 332; (iii) the purposes and principles of the
U.N. Charter, Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 318, 343; (iv) the Charter’s preamble, Mo-
khtar, supra note 19, at 319; (v) U.N. Charter Article 1(1), Mokhtar, supra note 19, at
320; (vi) U.N. Charter Article 2(1) (principle of sovereign equality), Mokhtar, supra
note 19, at 322; (vii) jus cogens norms, El Zeidy, supra note 28, at 1535;Mokhtar, supra
note 19, at 338, 343; and (viii) customary law and Geneva Convention and Genocide
Convention obligations, Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 339–341, made relevant through
Rome Statute Article 21.1(b).
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27 (no immunities), or other articles – conﬂicts with action mandated
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, then
it is the Security Council’s obligations that prevail. Indeed, this
appears to be suggested by Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, which
provides: In the event of a conﬂict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obliga-
tions under the present Charter shall prevail.’107 So, in other words,
under this reading, the obligations of U.N. Member States to adhere
to a Chapter VII resolution would trump the obligations of ICC
States Parties to adhere to the Rome Statute.108 In fact, it appears
that the Security Council has altered treaty provisions through
Chapter VII action, for example, in requiring Libya to extradite two
suspects pertaining to the Lockerbie bombing, thereby overriding the
1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation.109 There are at least two possible
responses to this. One is that a proper Chapter VII action could have
this eﬀect – but, as argued above, it is entirely questionable whether
Resolutions 1422 and 1487 were proper Chapter VII actions.110 A
second response is that Article 103 is not precisely on point (nor the
Libya example), because the Charter imposes obligations on U.N.
107 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 103.
108 See Lavalle, supra note 20, at 204 ([T]he Council may require action by States
that is inconsistent with a treaty to which they are parties’); ibid., at 205 (concluding
that the Council may require States parties to the Rome Statute, the ICC as a whole
or any of its organs, to conduct themselves in ways inconsistent with any provision of
the Rome Statute or with the Rome Statue as a whole.’).
109 See Lavalle, supra note 20, at 203 & n. 17–18 (the Council, pursuant to, inter
alia, Article 103 of the Charter, may cause states to act in ways… inconsistent with
their obligations and rights under [other] treaties to which they are parties’), citing
Resolution 748, depriving Libya of its rights under the 1971 Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation with
respect to the extradition of two fugitives pertaining to the Lockerbie bombing.
Lavalle also gives the example that the Council could, under Chapter VII, tempo-
rarily suspend the innocent passage of foreign ships through territorial sea’ in con-
travention of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Ibid., at 204.
110 See Lavalle, supra note 20, at 212 (Resolution 1422 is not an amendment to the
Rome Statute because it is unconstitutional’ so should have no eﬀect.’); El Zeidy,
supra note 28, at 1533 (Article 103 should not be invoked because conditions
precedent or the obligations which were supposed to arise from the Resolution and
required to activate the Article do not exist.’); Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 326 (be-
cause the requirements of the U.N. Charter have not been satisﬁed’ invocation of
Article 103 would not be justiﬁed).
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Member States (and the Lockerbie surrender obligations did pertain
to a state, Libya), but the Rome Statute obligations at issue provide
directives to the Prosecutor and Judges, not to states.111 Thus, the
Court enjoys its own, independent legal personality under Article 4 of
the Rome Statute and is therefore not directly bound by resolutions
of the Council addressed to United Nations Member States.’112 Put
another way, the Rome Statute instructs the Prosecutor and Judges
what to do if the Security Council makes a deferral, which they would
construe presumably in light of all provision of the Rome Statute,
including Articles 12(2), 16, and 27.113
Clearly, it is best to avoid a conﬂict between the Security Council
and the Court,114 and, in any event, both Resolutions 1422 and 1487
have now expired,115 so the Judges and Prosecutor will not face this
dilemma. Yet, these issues could still resurface if similar jurisdictional
exceptions are utilized as to peacekeeping or peace enforcement
deployments and troops or oﬃcials from non-ICC States Parties
commit Rome Statute crimes. (As discussed below, similar legal issues
exist as to language in Security Council referral Resolutions 1593 and
111 See Stahn, supra note 29, at 102 ([T]he Charter [is] an instrument which creates
legal duties for its members, but does not impose obligations on other international
organizations or entities themselves.’); Mokhtar, supra note 19, at 326 (Article 103 is
speaking to the UN Members, thus it does not have the same eﬀect on the ICC.’).
112 Stahn, supra note 29, at 88 (footnotes omitted).
113 An alternative interpretation of Resolutions 1422 and 1487 is that they provide
directives to U.N. Member States not to send anyone to the ICC if [the person] is a
[national of a non-state party].’ Response to Kevin Jon Heller, supra note 105.
According to this reading:
Under Article 25 of the UN Charter all decision of the Security Council are
obligations upon states to ‘‘accept and carry out.’’ At the same time, Article 98 of
the [Court’s] Statute allows states to refrain from cooperating with the Court if
they have a competing international obligation, in this case, this U.N. Security
Council resolution.
Ibid.
114 UNSC resolutions 1422 and 1487 had no practical eﬀect, and a referral that
didn’t include nationals of non-state parties is unlikely to have an eﬀect, unless the
OTP wants to imperil the institution by doing something like pursuing Russian
oﬃcials for aiding and abetting.’ Response to Kevin Jon Heller, supra note 105.
115 For one discussion of the validity of the non-States Parties jurisdictional carve
out in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1497, see S. Zappala, Are Some Peace-
keepers Better than Others? UN Security Council Resolution 1497 (2003) and the
ICC,’ 1 J. of Int’l Criminal Justice (2003) 671, at 675 (concluding that because there
was no legitimate threat to peace, Resolution 1497 was ultra vires).
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1970, both of which purport to exempt from ICC jurisdiction certain
nationals of non ICC-States Parties from referral of the situation.)116
2.3 Requests for Security Council Deferrals
As to the requests to date that Article 16 be utilized, as noted above,
the AU has requested that the warrant against Sudanese President
Bashir be deferred, and Kenya has requested that the cases covering
crimes committed in Kenya be deferred.117 Article 16 deferrals in
these instances would clearly be deferring existing investigations or
prosecutions’ – if we read that requirement into Article 16 – because
there are two arrests warrants outstanding against President Ba-
shir,118 and three Kenyan nationals slated to proceed to trial.119
The more signiﬁcant question is whether either deferral was, or
would be, required to address a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression’ – the required trigger language for
Chapter VII action.120 There is no evidence that the warrants against
President Bashir cause or caused a legitimate threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression.’ While President Bashir did
expel humanitarian relief eﬀorts subsequent to the issuance of his ﬁrst
warrant,121 to have permitted the deferral arguably would have al-
lowed him to be rewarded by his own threat to the peace.’ (He later
permitted resumption of humanitarian relief,122 so to the extent there
was any threat to the peace’ it appears to have terminated.) Again, as
noted above, it seems poor policy to let the person or state who would
beneﬁt from deferral be the person or state creating the threat to the
peace. While arguments were made that the Bashir warrants would
116 See part 3.2 infra.
117 See notes 73 & 75 supra.
118 Bashir First Arrest Warrant, supra note 74; Bashir Second Arrest Warrant,
supra note 74.
119 Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, and Prosecutor v.
William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11.
120 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 39.
121 Sudan’s Bashir Says 10 Aid Agencies Expelled’, Reuters, 5 Mar. 2009
(www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/05/idUSL5720994) (on 5 March 2009, one day
after the ICC issued its ﬁrst warrant for President Bashir, Reuters reported that
Bashir expelled ten foreign aid agencies.).
122 Sudan ‘‘Allows Agencies Back’’’, BBC, 12 June 2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/8096214.stm) (starting in June, 2009, Sudan began to allow aid agencies
back into Sudan provided that the agencies registered under slightly altered names
and logos).
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also undermine ongoing peace negotiations, that also does not appear
to have been the case.123 Similarly, as to the Kenya situation, whereas
there have been periodic fears of violence and some actual violence
subsequent to the commission of the crimes subject to the ICC’s
warrants, the situation is not caused by the ICC’s prosecutions, but
exist independently.124 Thus, deferral also does not appear to have
been or be warranted in this situation.
123 One policy paper explains:
[O]n 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor asked Pre-Trial Chamber I to issue an arrest
warrant for President al-Bashir on allegations of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. In response, the government of Sudan, supported by
Russia, China, Libya, the African Union (AU), and the League of Arab States,
argued that the Security Council should exercise its authority under Article 16 to
request the suspension of the proceedings inDarfur, claiming that the issuance of an
arrest warrant against al-Bashir would undermine ongoing eﬀorts to ﬁnd a peaceful
resolution to the conﬂict in Darfur.
War Crimes Research Oﬃce, supra note 73, at 3. See also ibid., at 5 (concluding it is
diﬃcult to make the case that the Security Council should request the deferral of
proceedings against President al-Bashir’ because [d]eferral of the proceedings… could
not… be seen as a means to maintain peace.’); Chatham House, supra note 33, at 16
(there are no serious peace talks taking place that could be blocked, and the arrest
warrant did not hamper the negotiation of the peace agreement regarding South Su-
dan….’).
Another possible argument is that the Security Council should not use Article 16 to
defer when it is responsible for the Article 13 referral in the ﬁrst place, see War Crimes
ResearchOﬃce, supra note 73, at 16, but ultimately concluding that Article 16 permits
the Security Council to seek to defer its own referrals.’ Ibid., at 27.
124 Calls for Kenya deferrals also do not seem linked to any threat to the peace, or
breach of the peace,’ but rather a change of heart by the government (once it became
clear the ICC was interested in prosecuting government ﬁgures) as to proceeding at
the ICC, rather than through a domestic process. See Moss, supra note 16, at 11
(The Council was entirely correct [in not granting a deferral related to the Kenya
cases], as deferral must be made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and therefore
requires a ﬁnding that ICC investigation would pose a threat to international peace
and security’); Chatham House, supra note 33, at 15 ([I]t was observed that the
Kenyan objections to the ICC’s investigations into the post-election violence only
came to light once the Prosecutor revealed the individuals under investigation.’);
Meeting Examines Kenya’s Peaceful Elections’, African Press International, 24 May
2013 (http://africanpress.me/2013/05/24/meeting-examines-kenyas-peaceful-elections/)
(discusses relative peace during elections and ICC’s deterrent eﬀect).
To the extent Kenya made a complementarity’ argument – that its national courts
should be utilized in lieu of the ICC – that did not present a threat to international peace
and security warranting deferral. See Chatham House, supra note 33, at 16 (In the
context of theKenyan indictments, the justiﬁcations to invokeArticle 16, for instance the
validity of the principle of complementarity, are disconnected from the legal basis for a
deferral, namely the existence of a threat to international peace and security.’).
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In summary, as to Article 16, one can conclude that deferral is
only proper when (1) there is an actual threat to the peace, breach
of peace or act of aggression’; and (2) possibly, when there is an
actual investigation or prosecution’ that needs to be suspended.
Additionally, it may be problematic to have deferrals that are
inconsistent with Rome Statute Article 27 (non-immunity provi-
sions). Measured against these criteria alone,125 questions arise as to
whether Resolutions 1422 and 1487 were proper uses of Article 16.
Deferrals of the Bashir warrants and Kenya cases also do not
appear to be proper uses of Article 16, as there has been no threat
to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression’ that has neces-
sitated the deferrals. Sound policy would also suggest that the
person or state advocating deferral should not be the person or
state creating the threat to the peace’ that purportedly justiﬁes
deferral.
III. THE TEXT OF THE REFERRAL RESOLUTION
A further question is what language a Security Council referral res-
olution should contain (or not contain). Two very criticized aspects
of the two referral resolutions to date, Security Council Resolutions
1593 and 1970, have been language whereby (1) the Security Council
disallowed, or at least purported to disallow, allocation of U.N. funds
to the ICC to pursue investigation and prosecution of the referred
situations, and (2) the Security Council excepted from jurisdiction
certain nationals of non-ICC States Parties from referral of the sit-
uation. Both provisions raise signiﬁcant pragmatic and legal issues.
Additionally, both resolutions imposed cooperation obligations only
upon the state at issue (Sudan and Libya). A better practice would be
for future referral resolutions to impose cooperation obligations on
all U.N. Member States.
125 Additional arguments can be made questioning the validity of Resolutions
1422 and 1487. See n. 106 supra.
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3.1 Whether the Security Council may Disallow the General Assembly
from Allocating U.N. Funds for an ICC Referral
Given the budget constraints the ICC has been facing, with an ever-
expanding number of investigations and cases, and demands for more
investigations and prosecutions, it has been a matter of serious
concern to ICC oﬃcials and Rome Statute States Parties126 that the
two referral resolutions to date contain language that none of the
expenses incurred in connection with the referral shall be borne by the
U.N.127 Clearly, the Rome Statute does not require that funding
accompany referrals (nor could the Rome Statute mandate that the
Security Council or General Assembly allocate funding, as both those
entities derive their powers from the U.N. Charter). Yet, pragmati-
cally, if the Security Council, for example, makes a number of con-
secutive referrals without funding accompanying them, the Court
could be in a serious predicament of having insuﬃcient funding to
investigate and/or prosecute the referred situations.128 This potential
problem has led some to suggest that the Prosecutor should decline to
initiate an investigation on a referred situation for which she does not
have suﬃcient funding, by invoking Article 53.1(c) that it would not
serve the interests of justice’ to proceed if unable to do so properly
due to lack of suﬃcient funding.129 Security Council member states,
particularly, but not limited to Rome Statute States Parties, should,
in the interests of ensuring the success of referrals, exclude this lan-
126 See, e.g., Chatham House, supra note 33, at 7 (If the Court is to fulﬁl its
mandate, it is imperative that it has the appropriate ﬁnancial cooperation and
support of the relevant institutions; whether it be the payment of dues by states
parties to the Rome Statute, or whether it be from the United Nations when the
Security Council makes a referral.’).
127 Resolution 1593, supra note 4, para. 7; Resolution 1970, supra note 5, para. 8.
128 See, e.g., Papenfuss, supra note 69, at 2, para. 3 (arguing that lack of funding
could undermine the viability of the court’). The ICC could then be in the diﬃcult
position of having to take resources away from cases already in progress in order to
proceed with another unfunded Security Council referral. Author e-mails with John
Washburn.
129 See K.J. Heller, A Few Thoughts on a Syria Referral’, Opinio Juris
(http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/14/a-few-thoughts-on-a-syria-referral/); see also
Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 53.1(c) (In deciding whether to initiate an inves-
tigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether… [t]aking into account the gravity of
the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice’).
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guage, leaving it to the General Assembly to consider the matter of
funding.130
Additionally, a serious legal question exists whether the Security
Council actually has the power not to have U.N. funds allocated to
the referral, when budget decisions, under the U.N. Charter, are
made by the General Assembly.131 Speciﬁcally, as noted above, the
Security Council has power to act under Chapter VII,132 and in
making referrals, it necessarily must act under Chapter VII.133 At the
same time, the U.N. Charter provides that [t]he General Assembly
shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.’134 Cer-
tainly, there is some potential for a conﬂict between the Security
Council’s Chapter VII powers and the General Assembly’s funding
powers, with no clear resolution as to which body prevails.135 Even if
the Security Council provides that no funding should accompany a
referral to the ICC (as it has), it is unclear that the General Assembly
would need to abide by that language, since these are independent
bodies, and Security Council resolutions are binding on U.N.
Member States,136 but not necessarily the General Assembly as a
130 A more benign interpretation of the language in Resolutions 1593 and 1970
related to U.N. funding is that both resolutions merely recognize[]’ that no U.N.
funds were, at the time of the referrals, allocated to pay for them, but that the
resolutions do not attempt to preclude the General Assembly from allocating funds.
This interpretation would certainly be in line with the U.N. Charter. Author e-mails
with Stephan Barriga.
131 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 17.1. See also Cryer, supra note 46, at 206
(By virtue of Article 17 of the UN Charter, exclusive authority over budgetary
matters is reserved to the General Assembly.’) (footnote omitted).
132 See U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Chapter VII.
133 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 13(b).
134 U.N. Charter, supra note 1, Art. 17.1.
135 Article 12.1 of the Charter states While the Security Council is exercising in
respect of anydispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the presentCharter, the
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or
situation unless the Security Council so requests.’ Yet, this may refer to substantive
matters of international peace and security, and not necessarily funding. Article 103 of
the UN Charter comes into play when there is a conﬂict between obligations imposed
under the Charter and obligations imposed under another treaty, but not to a potential
conﬂict within the Charter. See U.N. Charter, supra note 1, Art. 103.
136 See U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 25 (The Members of the United Nations
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter.’).
ICC AND U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 451
whole.137 The Rome Statute itself also suggests that the General
Assembly is the body that would allocate U.N. funds to pay for
Security Council referrals,138 as does the Relationship Agreement
between the ICC and the U.N.139
No doubt, this kind of dispute should be avoided. This author is
not recommending that the General Assembly necessarily allocate
funding to the two referred situations when the Security Council has
attempted to preclude that.140 Yet, the fact that it is not so clear that
137 See, e.g., Moss, supra note 16, at 6 (the Security Council should have remained
silent as to budget matters when it made its referrals because Article 17 of the UN
Charter grants the General Assembly (GA) exclusive authority over budgetary mat-
ters.’); Cryer, supra note 46, at 206–207 (It is questionable whether the Security Council
can pre-empt the General Assembly’s competence in this way….’); ibid., at 207 (It may
legitimately be inferred… that the Security Council is not able to pre-empt the judgment
of theGeneralAssemblyonbudgetarymeasures….’); ibid. (toallow theSecurityCouncil
todictatequestionsof fundingwould represent a considerable transferof authority to the
Security Council outside any Charter authority[.]’).
138 Article 115 states: The expenses of the Court and the Assembly of States
Parties… shall be provided by the following sources:… (b) Funds, provided by the
United Nations, subject to the approval of the General Assembly, in particular in
relation to the expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security Council.’ Rome
Statute, supra note 1, Art. 115 (emphasis added). See also M. Halﬀ and D. Tolbert,
in O. Triﬀterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2008), at 1712 (The phrase ‘‘subject to
the approval of the General Assembly’’ [in article 115 of the Rome Statute] appears
to… conﬁrm the obvious: budgetary provisions for the payment of expenses by the
UN require the General Assembly’s approval. The budgetary primacy of the General
Assembly is anchored in the Charter of the United Nations….’); Cryer, supra note
46, at 206 (the UN should not be able to redirect the costs of the activities of its
organs (in this case the Security Council).’).
139 Article 13, para. 1, states:
1. The United Nations and the Court agree that the conditions under which any
funds may be provided to the Court by a decision of the General Assembly of the
United Nations pursuant to article 115 of the Statute shall be subject to separate
arrangements. The Registrar shall inform the Assembly of the making of such
arrangements.
Negotiated Relationship Agreement, supra note 28, Art. 13, para. 1 (emphasis ad-
ded). Unhelpfully, the Negotiated Relationship Agreement appears to contemplate
the forming of separate arrangements’ before the General Assembly may provide
funding to the ICC. Author e-mails with C. Stahn.
140 The U.S., under the Bush Administration, made a rather provocative state-
ment’ warning against attempting to provide U.N. funding for the Darfur referral:
‘‘we want to be clear that any eﬀort to retrench on that principle [no expenses of
referral being borne by the UN] by this or other organizations to which we con-
tribute could result in our withholding funding or taking other action in response.’’’
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the Security Council may actually mandate the General Assembly not
allocate funding is good reason the Security Council should avoid
similar language in future referrals.
The U.S. most likely has had, and likely continues to have, par-
ticular concern about the prospect of U.N. funds being utilized to pay
for ICC investigations and prosecutions. U.S. dues comprised 22% of
the U.N. budget for 2013,141 and the U.S. has a current legislative
ban on funding the ICC.142 Thus, the argument is sometimes made
that the U.S. may not permit U.N. funds to go to the ICC as doing so
would violate U.S. law. Yet, one possible reading of U.S. law is that it
prohibits direct U.S. funding to the ICC, so that there would be no
problem with U.N. dues being utilized. Another possibility is that the
U.S. should work towards repealing legislation that prevents U.S.
funding in order to be able to support the ICC monetarily on a case-
by-case basis, a step that would certainly increase U.S. engagement
with the ICC and beneﬁt the ICC.143 If the Security Council supports
a referral, and the U.S. is either voting for it or abstaining (which is
necessarily the case for the vote to pass), then all Security Council
states (including the U.S.) should bear some responsibility for
Footnote 140 continued
Cryer, supra note 46, at 207 (quoting US acting permanent representative, Anne
Patterson, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158, at 4).
141 U.N. Secretariat, Assessment of Member States’ Contributions to the United
Nations Regular Budget for the Year 2013 and of New Member States’ Advances to
the Working Capital Fund for the Biennium 2010–2011 and Contributions to the
United Nations Regular Budget for 2011 and 2012, U.N. Doc. ST/ADM/SER.B/866
(24 December 2012), at 6 (www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ADM/
SER.B/866).
142 The Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Autho-
rization Act, expressly prohibits the use of funds to the ICC, stating that [n]one of
the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be obligated
for use by, or for support of, the International Criminal Court unless the United
States has become a party to the Court pursuant to a treaty made under Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States on or after the date of
enactment of this Act.’ Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 3427), Public
Law No. 106–113 (29 November 1999), at §§ 705–706.
143 The American Branch of the International Law Association International
Criminal Court Committee, of which this author is chairperson, has recommended
this by letter dated 24 July 2013 to U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Stephen J. Rapp,
Oﬃce of Global Criminal Justice, and William K. Lietzau, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense (Detainee Policy). See http://ila-americanbranch.org/reports/
20130724_ICC_Letter.pdf.
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ensuring the success of the referral. It therefore seems both wise
practice to have the General Assembly decide on funding, and poor
practice to continue to utilize language to the contrary, which may
not be an eﬀective legal constraint on General Assembly action in any
event. Another (less preferable) option would be to create a voluntary
fund for each referral, and seek voluntary contributions, as has been
the Secretary-General’s approach to funding the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.144
3.2 Whether the Nationals of Non-States Parties may be Excluded
from the Referral
An even more contentious issue concerns the exclusions of nationals
from non-ICC States Parties from ICC jurisdiction when situations
are referred. As mentioned above, language to this eﬀect has been
included in both of the past two referral resolutions. Thus, for
example, Security Council Resolution 1970, inter alia:
Decides that nationals, current or former oﬃcials or personnel from a State
outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such
exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State[.]145
Security Council Resolution 1593 contains similar language.146
The U.S. was the key proponent of including such language.147
While evaluating all issues implicated as to whether the nationals of
144 This Author ﬁnds the voluntary funding option less preferable because it can
hamstring work if funding is not forthcoming, and can require Prosecutors to expend
energy fundraising rather than on their primary duties.
145 Resolution 1970, supra note 5, para. 6.
146 Resolution 1593, supranote 4, para. 6. SeeCryer, supranote 46, at 208 (discussing
the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Resolution 1497 (Liberia) as
precedent for the jurisdictional carve-out for nationals of non-ICC States Parties).
147 According to Robert Cryer:
As a quid pro quo for its abstention [on the Darfur referral], the United States
insisted on three things, the ﬁrst being that no funding would be forthcoming from
the UN for the costs of the investigations in Darfur…. The second demand made
by the United States was that the resolution make reference to the (controversial)
bilateral immunity agreements that it ha[d] made with a number of countries….
[The third was] the inclusion of operative paragraph 6 [the carve-out of jurisdic-
tion as to peacekeepers who are nationals of non ICC-States Parties].
Cryer, supra note 46, at 204–205.
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non-ICC States Parties should be excluded from referrals is beyond
the scope of this article, suﬃce it to say that many other states,
particularly ICC States Parties, view these exemptions as a form of
exceptionalism.148 This is particularly so because three of the Per-
manent Members of the Security Council (the U.S., China, and
Russia) are non-ICC States Parties. These three states therefore have
the power to vote for or against referrals and deferrals (including veto
power), but then may ensure that their nationals are exempt not only
from direct referral, but even exempt from referrals of other situa-
tions, in the event one of their nationals were implicated, for example,
in crimes committed in Darfur or Libya.
As to the U.S., this exclusion can be seen as following on the heels
of a virulent anti-ICC campaign that occurred during the ﬁrst term of
the Bush II Administration – part of which included insistence on
Resolutions 1422 and 1487.149 While the second four years of the
Bush II Administration did not continue with this same hostility to
the ICC (as can be seen from the fact that the U.S. did not veto the
Darfur referral, but abstained from voting),150 U.S. support for the
exclusion reﬂects continuing wariness of the ICC within certain areas
of the U.S. government. While one might look forward to the day
when the U.S. is willing to deploy its armed forces or support
referrals without seeking such exclusions from ICC jurisdiction, that
148 Cryer, supra note 46, at 217 (carve-outs of jurisdiction for non-States Parties
create the perception of ‘‘double standards’’’ and ‘‘two track justice’’’) (quoting
comments of the permanent representative of Algeria as to Resolution 1593). See
also Papenfuss, supra note 69, at 1, para. 2 (The wider negative implications for the
ICC’s credibility, impartiality, and independence suggest that future use of exemp-
tions should be avoided.’).
149 See Part 2.2 supra.
150 See Cryer, supra note 46, at 221 (abstention [on the Darfur referral was] a
move away from the scathing anti-ICC rhetoric that ha[d] characterized the con-
tributions of some members of the US government to the debate’), citing remarks of
J.R. Bolton. There were many reasons for the US abstention, including exhaustion of
eﬀorts by the US to ﬁnd acceptable alternatives. For an explanation of why the US
abstained on the Darfur vote, see Cryer, supra note 46, at 199–205.
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day is not at hand.151 The U.S. has sometimes argued that it has
military exposure that other countries do not bear,152 and in some
ways this is correct. It is not the same thing to evaluate such questions
from the perspective of countries such as Liechtenstein or Samoa.153
While this author does not support the U.S. in always seeking to
exclude itself from such exposure, it is not necessarily an irrational
position. (Seeking such exclusions as to peacekeeping and peace
enforcement deployments in fact appears mandated by current U.S.
law.)154 While a country can always avoid ICC jurisdiction by
prosecuting crimes genuinely through its own domestic system, it is
the ICC that will judge under the standards of Rome Statute Article
17 the genuineness of national court prosecutions – that is, if national
courts are willing’ and able’ to prosecute.155 If this standard is not
151 This author does not share the assessment that it is so unlikely as to be
practically impossible that personnel, military or a fortiori civilians, belonging to
United Nations peace operations could commit crimes failing within the jurisdiction
of the ICC.’ Lavalle, supra note 20, at 216.
152 See, e.g., W. Lietzau, The United States and the International Criminal Court:
International Criminal Law After Rome: Concerns from a U.S. Military Perspective’
(2001) 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 119, at 125–129 (The U.S. military has been much
criticized for its stance on… the ICC Statute, but what the critics sometimes fail to
recognize are the unique and vital national security responsibilities of the U.S. armed
forces and the consequences of their front-line role in carrying out the nation’s
national security strategy.’). Lietzau represented the Department of Defense as part
of the U.S. negotiating team at both the Rome Conference and the Kampala Review
Conference.
153 The situations of the U.K. and France are, however, probably more compa-
rable; both countries are periodically involved in foreign military interventions, yet
both are Rome Statute States Parties. Author e-mails with Stephan Barriga.
154 The so-called American Servicemembers’ Protection act has a provision that
states:
the President should use the voice and vote of the United States in the United
Nations Security Council to ensure that each resolution of the Security Council
authorizing any peacekeeping operation under chapter VI of the charter of the
United Nations or peace enforcement operation under chapter VII of the charter
of the United Nations permanently exempts, at a minimum, members of the
Armed Forces of the United States participating in such operation from criminal
prosecution or other assertion of jurisdiction by the International Criminal
Court for actions undertaken by such personnel in connection with the opera-
tion.
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 (H.R. 4775), Public Law No.
107–206 (as amended 17 October 2006 and 28 January 2008), §105(a).
155 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 17 (deﬁning unwilling’ and unable’). The
U.S. generally is not unable’ to hold trials that would satisfy Article 17’s standards,
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met and jurisdiction exists, then the state’s nationals could, and
arguably should, face ICC exposure. Of course, one hopes to reach a
point where all countries are willing and able to prosecute genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity if committed by their
nationals, or be willing to have the ICC do so.156 While the U.S.
under the Obama Administration has a policy of positive engage-
ment’ with the ICC,157 its position regarding exclusions from juris-
diction for the nationals of non-ICC States Parties apparently has not
changed, since such an exclusion was included in the Libya referral
(negotiated during the Obama Administration).158
A diﬀerent question entirely is whether such exclusion language is
valid as a legal matter. It is fairly clear that the U.N. Security Council
Footnote 155 continued
although there might be certain lacunae in U.S. law that could make the exercise of
complementarity diﬃcult, for instance, the absence of any crimes against humanity
legislation. More saliently, however, issues as to unwillingness’ could arise.
156 As former U.S.War Crimes Ambassador David Scheﬀer and his co-author have
eloquently articulated: The beneﬁts of support of the ICC far outweigh the presumed
costs, particularly in American credibility and leadership in its foreign policy and its
commitment to the rule of law globally. This is especially true for the U.S. Armed
Forces, which have farmore to gain fromparticipating in bringing leading perpetrators
of atrocity crimes to justice than from continued U.S. opposition to the ICC and
absence from its vital work.’ D. Scheﬀer and J. Hutson, Strategy for U.S. Engagement
with the International Criminal Court’ (2008) A Century Foundation Report, at 21.
157 U.S. Engagement With The International Criminal Court and The Outcome
of the Recently Concluded Review Conference’, remarks of Harold Hongju Koh,
Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State, and Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-
Large for War Crimes Issues (Washington, DC, 15 June 2010) at http://geneva.
usmission.gov/2010/06/15/u-s-engagement-with-the-icc/ [viewed 2/9/13].
158 An exclusion from ICC jurisdiction for non-ICC States Parties was also in-
cluded in the crime of aggression amendment adopted at the Kampala Review
Conference, negotiations that also occurred during the Obama Administration. See
Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 15bis, para. 5 (In respect of a State that is not a
party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression when committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.’).
In terms of US motivations, one author argues:
[T]he most important members of the Security Council usually approach the
subjects of criminal law not primarily or uniquely with a long term and strategic
view of what should transpire for the common good in a lawful world order, but
rather with strong consideration of how they can adequately manage to protect
their immediate subjective national interests given various pressures and power
realities.
Forsythe, supra note 99, at 842.
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has very broad powers when acting under Chapter VII,159 so it most
likely has power to make this exclusion.160 A more salient inquiry is
whether the Judges and Prosecutor (who are governed by the Rome
Statute)161 have to respect the validity of such an exclusion, when
Rome Statute Article 13(b) states that the Security Council shall refer
a situation.’162 Does this then permit the Security Council to refer
less than a full situation? Could it refer only the rebels in a situation?
Could it refer only government actors?163 Well, it probably could, but
that does not mean the Judges and Prosecutor would be bound by
such partial referrals, when Article 13(b) states that the referral is to
cover the situation’ in a country. Put another way, [t]he Court… has
no obligation whatsoever to comply with a referral’ that does not
comply with Art. 13(b).’164 An analogy might here be made to the
159 See note 102 supra.
160 A contrary argument might also be made that reserving exclusive jurisdiction
to the troop-sending state inappropriately overrides applicable domestic jurisdiction
that would otherwise exist. Author e-mails with C. Stahn.
161 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 21.1(a).
162 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 13(b).
163 [Another] way of seeing [the non-State Party carve-out of jurisdiction in
Resolution 1593] is that it reﬂects the Security Council’s wish to refer the situation in
Darfur to the ICC except insofar as it regards personnel of non-state parties.’ Cryer,
supra note 46, at 210.
164 As concluded in an International Peace Institute Meeting Brief’:
The exclusion of certain groups from ICC prosecution [in Resolutions 1593 and
1970] is problematic…. At the time, this was considered necessary to secure
political buy-in at the Security Council. However, the legality of exemptions has
been challenged on the grounds that a Security Council referral can only activate
the Rome Statute as a whole, not select parts thereof. It is therefore questionable
whether these exemption clauses would withstand judicial scrutiny in the court
itself, and they also expose the court to criticisms of selectivity. The wider negative
implications for the ICC’s credibility, impartiality, and independence suggest that
future use of exemptions should be avoided.
Global Policy Forum, The Relationship Between the ICC and the Security Council:
Challenges and Opportunities’ (2012) International Peace Institute (www.global
policy.org/international-justice/the-international-criminal-court/icc-in-the-security-
council-6-4/52118-the-relationship-between-the-icc-and-the-security-council-
challenges-and-opportunities.html). See also D. Kaye, The Council and The Court:
Improving Security Council Support of the International Criminal Court’ (2013)
Univ. of California School of Law, at 6 (http://councilandcourt.org/ﬁles/2013/05/
The-Council-and-the-Court-FINAL.pdf) (Some observers believe that, if such a
situation were presented to a chamber of the Court, the judges may ignore the
exemption [from investigation of citizens of non-state parties] and apply the Rome
Statute, assuming jurisdiction and admissibility requirements are met.’); K.J. Heller,
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Uganda referral, when the Government of Uganda attempted to refer
only the ‘‘situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army’’’ to the
ICC, but the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor informed the Government of
Uganda that it interpreted the referral to refer to all article 5 crimes of
relevance to the situation.’165 The OTP thus appropriately rejected a
one-sided referral of less than the full situation,’ because Article 14(1)
of the Rome Statute permits a State Party to refer a situation’ (not
only one-side to the conﬂict).166 Similarly, there is at least a legal
question whether a category of persons may be exempted from a
referral in the way that Resolutions 1593 and 1970 purport to do.167
The directives that States Parties have given to the Prosecutor and
Judges in Rome Statute Article 13(b) as to Security Council referral
of a situation,’ may well be less than the Security Council’s own
broad powers vis-a`-vis U.N. Member States. Presumably, the Pros-
ecutor and Judges also will interpret any referral in light of Rome
Footnote 164 continued
supra note 105 (the very ﬁrst article of the Rome Statute provides that ‘‘[t]he
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this
Statute.’’’); cf. Bergsmo, supra note 84, at 600 (The drafting history of the ICC
Statute makes it clear that the term ‘‘situations’’ that may be referred to the Pros-
ecutor by a State Party of the Security Council was deliberately used to exclude the
referral of individual cases for investigation.’).
165 See Draft OTP Policy Paper, supra note 23, at para. 35 (discussing the Uganda
referral).
166 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 14(1) (A State party may refer to the
Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court appear to have been committed….’) (emphasis added).
167 As Robert Cryer has argued: it seems not supportable that only certain persons
can be referred (that there may be limitations ratione personae’) and concluding [i]f
the Council can only refer situations… then it cannot limit the referral, even by
excluding a small group.’ Cryer, supra note 46, at 212.
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Statute Article 27 (no exemption from responsibility based on oﬃcial
capacity), as well as other provisions of the Rome Statute.168
Alternatively, rather than considering Resolutions 1593 and 1970
as partial’ referrals, it is also possible to consider these resolutions as
simultaneously Article 13(b) referrals of the situations in Darfur and
Libya, and also Article 16 deferral as to certain nationals of non-
States Parties.169 (Indeed the preambles of Resolutions 1593 and 1970
recall[]’ Article 16 of the Rome Statute, suggesting this might have
been intended.) But this interpretation also runs into diﬃculties.
Three arguments suggest that the resolutions cannot be considered
both referrals and deferrals: (1) Article 16 covers deferral of partic-
ular investigations or prosecutions’ and not categories of individuals;
(2) Article 16 is limited to a 12 month time-period, but there is no
sunset clause’ on the carve-out of jurisdiction as to nationals of non-
States Parties; and (3) questions could be asked about whether the
immunity granted was demonstrably in the interests of international
peace and security’ (i.e., whether there was proper Chapter VII action
that warranted the deferral part).170 It does not appear that non-ICC
States Parties are implicated in any signiﬁcant ICC crimes in Darfur
168 Other relevant articles might be Article 12’s jurisdictional regime and the
purposes and principles of the Rome Statute, as articulated in the preamble, as well
as other bodies of law – such as customary international law, jus cogens, and
Genocide and Geneva Convention obligations, made relevant through Rome Statute
Article 21.1(b).
Another argument is that these jurisdictional carve-outs are in eﬀect amendments
to the jurisdictional regime of the Rome Statute, and invalid because the Security
Council has no power to amend the Rome Statute. See Cryer, supra note 46, at 213
(the Security Council does not have the authority to alter the Rome Statute. The
ICC is a separate international person to its members and is not a party to the UN
Charter; therefore it is not bound by the trumping provisions contained in Article
103 of the Charter.’). See also n. 106 supra (arguing Resolution 1422 was an invalid
attempt to amend the Rome Statute).
169 See Cryer, supra note 46, at 209.
170 Cryer, supra note 46, at 210–211. For example, one might ask:
[W]ould a [Security Council] decision attempting to coerce states to participate in
a functional impunity of certain individuals who are reasonably accused of having
committed or, for example abetted core crimes of genocide, other crimes against
humanity, or war crimes (and later manifest aggression) actually serve peace,
security, self-determination of peoples, and human rights?
Response to Kevin Jon Heller, supra note 105. Cryer notes that: The third way of
seeing [the carve-out of jurisdiction as to non-ICC States Parties in Resolution 1593]
is that it is an application of bilateral non-surrender agreements to the situation.’
Cryer, supra note 46, at 210 (but concluding this is the least convincing reading).
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or Libya, so this issue will not be adjudicated for the time-being.171
Yet, it is far from clear that these exclusions from jurisdiction for the
nationals of non-ICC States Parties are valid.172
It is a complicated issue whether to support a referral if the price
of the referrals is to have provisions: (1) purporting to disallow the
General Assembly from allocating U.N. funding to pay for the
referral, and (2) purporting to exclude jurisdiction as to nationals of
non-ICC States Parties from referral of the situation. Certainly in
instances of extremely serious atrocity crimes such as those that
occurred in Darfur – which this author has concluded constitute
genocide173 – this author supports the view that it is better to have the
referral resolution, even if ﬂawed. [I]t is better to ensure that some
international crimes are prosecuted than to risk no prosecutions by
too strict an application of principle.’174 Another view, however,
would be possible, if, for example, peacekeepers from a non-ICC
State Party had committed signiﬁcant ICC crimes within the territory
of a state that is the subject of a Security Council referral. Even
absent that, it should not become standard practice to have these
provisions in all Security Council referral resolutions, as they (1)
create a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial predicament for the Court, (2) engender
171 The carve-out from ICC jurisdiction for nationals of non-ICC States Parties
that is part of the Kampala Review Conference amendment on the crime of
aggression, see Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 15bis, para. 5, by contrast, is on a
more secure foundation because it is an amendment to the Rome Statute, and the
Judges and Prosecutor would be bound to adhere to it once activated. If there were
perceived to be some inconsistency between the crime of aggression amendment and
Article 27, that inconsistency was presumably waived by States Parties in Kampala.
For background on the Kampala amendment process, see J. Trahan, Negotiating
the Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Proceedings at the Kampala Review
Conference on the International Criminal Court’ (2011) 11 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 49.
172 As argued in the summary paper of an International Peace Institute roundtable
discussion: It is… questionable whether these exemption clauses would withstand
judicial scrutiny in the court itself, and they also expose the court to criticisms of
selectivity.’ Papenfuss, supra note 69, at 1, para. 2. While some have argued that the
Darfur referral, due to the carve-out as to non-States Parties is illegal,’ see Jiminez,
supra note 2, at 92, this author suggests that both the Darfur and Libya referrals are
valid, but questions the eﬃcacy of the carve-outs vis-a`-vis the nationals of non-ICC
States Parties. In other words, to the extent the Court ﬁnds particular language in
Resolutions 1593 or 1970 problematic, it might be possible to construe that language
as severable from the rest of the referral resolution. Author e-mails with C. Stahn.
173 See J. Trahan, Why the Killing in Darfur is Genocide’ (2008) 31 Fordham Int’l
L. J. 990.
174 Cryer, supra note 46, at 218.
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cynicism in terms of the unequal application of the rule of law vis-a`-
vis the nationals of non-ICC States Parties, and (3) may be legally
invalid.
3.3 The Security Council Should Impose Cooperation Obligations on
All U.N. Members States vis-a`-vis Referred Situations
The two Security Council referral resolutions to date also contain only
cooperation obligations vis-a`-vis the states subject to referral.175 Thus,
for example, in the Libya referral, the Security Council [d]ecides that
the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with and provide any
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this
resolution….’176 The Darfur referral contains similar language obli-
gating the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conﬂict in
Darfur’ to cooperate with the Court and Prosecutor.177
It appears problematic to only have the countries subject to
referral bear cooperation obligations. It is a matter of serious concern
that all the ICC warrants against Sudanese government oﬃcials (as
well as one Janjaweed leader) remain unexecuted.178 While Rome
Statute States Parties owe cooperation obligations to the ICC
(including vis-a`-vis referred situations),179 non-ICC States Parties owe
no such cooperation obligations. Thus, pressure has been put to bear
on ICC States Parties not to, for example, permit Sudanese President
Bashir to travel to their territories (or to arrest him if he does); this
has seriously curtailed President Bashir’s travel.180 Yet, President
175 Resolution 1593, supra note 4, para. 2; Resolution 1970, supra note 5, para. 5.
176 Resolution 1970, supra note 5, para. 5.
177 Resolution 1593, supra note 4, para. 2.
178 These are the warrants in: The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun
(Ahmad Harun’) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb’), ICC-
02/05-01/07; The Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12;
and The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09. The ICC’s
voluntary summonses to appear against rebel commanders, by contrast, have
resulted in the accused appearing before the ICC. Summons to appear, The Prose-
cutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09; Summons to appear, The Pros-
ecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus,
ICC-02/05-03/09.
179 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 86 (States Parties shall, in accordance with the
provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’).
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Bashir remains free to travel to the territories of non-ICC States
Parties, because they do not owe any cooperation obligations to the
Court and the Security Council’s referral resolution only imposes
cooperation obligations upon Sudan.181 A similar quandary was
faced when Abdullah Al-Senussi, against whom an ICC warrant had
been issued for crimes committed in Libya, was found in Maurita-
nia;182 Mauritania – a non-ICC State Party – owed no obligation to
turn him over to the ICC, and the referral resolution only imposed
duties upon Libya.
Thus, in future U.N. Security Council referral resolutions, the
Security Council should include text to the eﬀect that it: Decides that
all U.N. Member States shall cooperate fully with and provide any
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this
resolution.’ The Security Council could also provide speciﬁc steps
that a target state should take [as to cooperation], rather than simply
obliging the state to ‘‘cooperate fully’’ with the Court.’183 An obli-
gation to cooperate imposed upon all U.N. Member States would
help facilitate both execution of arrest warrants, as well as coopera-
tion on other matters.184 Conditionality has also been suggested –
180 Oral Statements of Richard Dicker, Director, International Justice Program,
Human Rights Watch, made at the UN, 22 February 2013. Notes on ﬁle with the
Author.
181 States that are parties to the Genocide Convention arguably also owe some
obligation to act pursuant to the extradite or prosecute obligations in that conven-
tion. See 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Arts. 1 & 4 (obligation to punish); Art. 7 (obligation to
extradite).
182 Mauritania deports Libya spy chief Abdullah al-Senussi’, BBC News Africa, 5
September 2012 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19487228).
183 Chatham House, supra note 33, at 18. The Security Council resolutions
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also only contained wording obligating
states to cooperate fully’ with the respective tribunals. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), at para. 4; U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), at para. 2.
ICC AND U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 463
that there be clear incentives linked to ICC cooperation.185 Because
the Security Council’s powers extend to all U.N. Member States,186 it
clearly has the power to mandate cooperation with the ICC by all
U.N. Member States as to referred situations,187 and could also play
a role in supporting the ICC as to non-referred situations with which
it is seized.188
184 As discussion at an IPI roundtable concluded:
Future referrals would beneﬁt from a provision making cooperation by all states
mandatory. TheSecurityCouncil has not lent suﬃcient support to the situations it has
referred to the ICC. In order to make referrals eﬀective, the council should follow up
on referral decisions to enforce cooperation – for example, by imposing targeted
sanctions (travel bans or asset freezes that could then serve to pay defendants’ legal
counsel or reparations to victims). States parties have adoptedpolicies to address non-
cooperation among members of the Assembly of States Parties, yet they too can do
more to support the court directly and indirectly by pressuring the SecurityCouncil to
take action.
Papenfuss, supra note 69, at 2, para. 4. See also B. Ugarte, Enhancing Security Council
Cooperation with the International Criminal Court’, paper on ﬁle with the author
(discussing the need to put ICC indictees on Security Council sanctions lists).
185 See Chatham House, supra note 33, at 13 (Taking inspiration from the EU’s
policy of conditionality when engaging with would-be EU member states, one pos-
sible strategy to encourage cooperation with the ICC could be the introduction of
bilateral and multilateral incentives for cooperation.’).
186 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, Art. 25.
187 The U.S. had a statutory ban on cooperation with the ICC. See ASPA, supra
note 154, at § 2004. That ban, however, has since been waived by the Dodd
Amendment,’ which states: Nothing in this title shall prohibit the United States from
rendering assistance to international eﬀorts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein,
Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, other members of Al Qaeda, leaders of
Islamic Jihad, and other foreign nationals accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes
against humanity.’ Amendment No. 3787 to Amendment No. 3597 (www.
amicc.org/docs/Dodd2nddeg.pdf) (emphasis added).
188 As concluded in a Chatham House report:
In such scenarios [where the Security Council is seized of the matter], the Council
could directly or indirectly provide support and cooperation to the Court when it has
initiated investigations or issued arrest warrants in situations within its treaty-based
jurisdiction…. This cooperation could take onmany forms, some of which would not
require the invocation of Chapter VII. Whether it be the simple provision of political
and diplomatic support, both in public and privately, to the Court, or whether it be
the coordination of its sanctions regime to support the Court’s activities, or the
strengthening of peacekeeping mandates to ensure that peacekeeping operations
cooperate eﬀectively with the Court’s investigations, the Security Council could do a
lot more to provide material support to the Court.
Chatham House, supra note 33, at 10.
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IV. THE NEED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL FOLLOW-UP
TO ITS REFERRALS
A ﬁnal concern as to the text of the referral resolution, as well as the
Security Council’s role regarding the referral, is whether it is suﬃcient
for the Security Council to make a referral, or whether it ought to
have some continuing obligation as to the referral. One frequently
heard complaint with the two existing referrals is that while the ICC
Prosecutor is required twice yearly to brief the Security Council as to
progress on the referred situations,189 the Security Council does not
seem to regard itself as having any on-going commitment to ensure
that investigations and/or prosecutions actually proceed,190
or, has only recently come to consider itself to have follow-up obli-
gations.191 While, as noted above, both referral resolutions contain
language that the states subject to referral bear cooperation obliga-
tions,192 and States Parties to the ICC are statutorily obligated to
cooperate under the Rome Statute,193 these obligations do not nec-
essarily translate into successful investigations and/or prosecutions.
For example, as noted above, due to the fact that none of the arrest
warrants for crimes committed in Darfur have been executed, most of
189 Resolution 1593, supra note 4, para. 8; Resolution 1970, supra note 5, para. 7.
190 It was observed that one of the greatest dangers to the eﬀectiveness of the
Court is the failure of the Council to provide follow up support to the ICC once it
has referred to it a situation.’ Chatham House, supra note 33, at 9.
191 On 12 February 2013, the Council adopted a Presidential Statement (PRST) on
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conﬂict, which, in para. 9, highlights the role of the
ICC and speciﬁcally mentions the importance of eﬀective follow up:
The Security Council notes that the ﬁght against impunity and accountability for
the most serious crimes of international concern has been strengthened through
the work on and prosecution of these crimes in the International Criminal Court,
in accordance with the Rome Statute, in ad hoc and mixed’ tribunals as well as
specialized chambers in national tribunals. In this regard, the Security Council
reiterates its previous call on the importance of State cooperation with these
courts and tribunals in accordance with the states’ respective obligations, and
expresses its commitment to an eﬀective follow up of Council decisions in this regard.
Security Council PRST 2012/2, para. 9 (emphasis added).
192 Resolution 1593, supra note 4, para. 2; Resolution 1970, supra note 5, para. 5.
193 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 86.
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the ICC’s Darfur cases have ground to a halt.194 While the Court has
notiﬁed the Security Council of instances of non-cooperation by
states in their failure to give eﬀect to ICC arrest warrants arising out
of the referral of the situation in Darfur,’ the Council has failed to
take any action pursuant to those notiﬁcations.’195
The need for the Security Council to bear follow-up obligations to
help ensure that its referrals actually succeed, was recently persua-
sively addressed by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II:
[U]nlike domestic courts, the ICC has no direct enforcement mechanism in the
sense that it lacks a police force. As such, the ICC relies mainly on the States’
cooperation, without which it cannot fulﬁl its mandate. When the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers a situation to the
Court as constituting a threat to international peace and security, it is expected
that the Council would respond by way of taking such measures which are con-
sidered appropriate, if there is an apparent failure on the part of the relevant State
Party to the Statute to cooperate in fulﬁlling the Court’s mandate entrusted to it
by the Council. Otherwise, if there is no follow up action on the part of the
Security Council, any referral by the Council to the ICC under Chapter VII would
never achieve its ultimate goal, namely, to put an end to impunity. Accordingly,
any such referral would become futile.196
It is noteworthy that when the Security Council imposes sanctions,
it frequently creates a sanctions committee’ to monitor implemen-
tation of sanctions; one idea that warrants consideration is whether
there should be some kind of Security Council working group for
ICC referrals’ (similar to the Security Council’s working group on
Tribunals) or other forum to remain fully up-to-date on the ICC’s
194 See n. 74 above (Bashir warrants).
195 Chatham House, supra note 33, at 9. The Court has made ﬁndings of non-
compliance against Rome Statute State Parties that do not adhere to their obliga-
tions, such as Chad’s failure to arrest Sudanese President Bashir – against whom
there are two pending ICC arrest warrants – upon his visit to Chad. The ICC notiﬁed
both the Security Council and ICC Assembly of States Parties of the non-compli-
ance. See The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Non-
Compliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the
Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-
02/05-01/09, 26 March 2013 (Pre-trial Chamber II) (hereinafter, Decision on the
Non-Compliance of Chad’).
196 Decision on the Non-Compliance of Chad, supra note 195, at para. 22. See
also, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/2012/731 (2012), Letter dated 1 October 2012 from the
Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary General,’ para. 10 (Follow-up by the Council on its own referrals to the
Court is important for the credibility of the Council and for the legitimacy of
international criminal justice.’).
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work on referred situations and assist the ICC should requests be
made.197 The Council also might consider the harmonization of
sanctions mechanisms, such as asset freezes and travel bans, with ICC
indictments.198 To date there has been no automaticity of asset
freezes or travel bans when the ICC has issued arrest warrants; ra-
ther, designation of individuals subject to asset freezes and travel
bans remains subject to voting by relevant Security Council com-
mittees.199 An additional possibility is that, to the extent the Security
Council is unresponsive to reports of non-cooperation, the ICC might
consider engaging the U.N. General Assembly,200 for example, when
the ICC President provides an annual report to the General Assem-
bly. As suggested above, including text in the referral resolution that
mandates all U.N. Member States cooperate with the referral would
also facilitate follow-up.
If too many of the Security Council’s referrals do not result in
successful ICC prosecutions, this ultimately undermines both the
referral process and, ultimately, the Security Council’s credibility and
any potential threat of deterrence that referral could carry. Thus, the
Security Council should have an interest in ensuring the success of its
own referrals lest this mechanism become a hollow gesture.
197 A recent Chatham House committee report explains:
Drawing upon the practice of establishing Sanctions Committees to monitor the
implementation, enforcement and consequences of the sanctions regimes imposed
under Chapter VII, it was suggested that similar subsidiary bodies could be
established to focus upon referrals to the ICC. This, it was suggested, might
stimulate better follow-up by the Council.
Chatham House, supra note 33, at 10. See also Papenfuss, supra note 69, at 2, para. 7
(Dedicated fora should also address issues concerning situations referred to the ICC.
The Security Council’s informal working group on tribunals could be expanded to
deal with ICC issues, or a separate mechanism could be created.’); ibid., at 2, para. 6
(For example, [the Security Council] could regularly hold open debates on peace,
justice, and the ICC. It should also develop a coherent accountability agenda and
refrain from endorsing amnesties and using the veto when Rome Statute crimes
appear to have been committed.’).
198 See Chatham House, supra note 33, 9 (there is a need for the [harmonization]
of sanctions imposed by the Council against individuals who are also sought by the
Court.’).
199 See, e.g., Resolution 1970, supra note 5, paras. 15–22 (creating travel bans and
asset freezes for individuals implicated in serious human rights abuses’ to be des-
ignated by a sanctions committee of the Security Council).
200 Author e-mails with C. Stahn.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Security Council’s referral and deferral powers under the ICC’s
Rome Statute are extremely signiﬁcant because a political body has a
role in determining who stands in the docket of a judicial institution.
The ICC’s institutional autonomy is preserved in the event of a referral,
because the Prosecutor only proceeds if she or he independently be-
lieves that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation.
In the event of a deferral, however, it is unclear whether the Prosecutor
or Judges would have any power to override a properlymade deferral –
but arguably should only adhere to a proper deferral request that
satisﬁes the standards of the Rome Statute.201 It is key to understand
the legal parameters of when referrals and deferrals are permissible and
should be granted, and identify best practice recommendation, if any.
A summary of the conclusions and recommendations made in this
article is contained in Appendix A hereto.
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VI. APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Referrals
As to the Security Council’s power to refer situations, the following
observations may be made.
Minimum Requirements for Security Council Action
• Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter requires only a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ before the Security
Council may act.
201 [T]he Court is the ﬁnal arbiter over the interpretation of the Statute. One may
therefore infer that it is vested with the authority to refuse to implement a Council
request that exceeds the limits of Article 16 of the Statute.’ Stahn, supra note 29, at
102.
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• Rome Statute Article 13(b) reiterates that a referral be made pur-
suant to Chapter VII.
• Rome Statute Article 13(b) additionally requires that one or more
ICC crime appears to have been committed.’
• Given the magnitude of most ICC crimes, the requirement of one
or more ICC crime is not that low of a threshold, and most likely
will also meet the requirement of a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression.’
Whether the Security Council is Ever Obligated to Act
• The Security Council is charged with maintaining international
peace and security under the U.N. Charter and a referral might
be one possible, but not necessarily a suﬃcient, step towards
doing so.
• The responsibility to protect’ doctrine suggests that the Security
Council has an increasingly solidifying legal obligation to act in the
face of large scale atrocity crimes, with referral again constituting
one possible, but not necessarily a suﬃcient, step.
Considerations as to Timing of a Referral and Deterrence
• While the minimum requirements for action suggest that the
Security Council may act fairly early on in referring a situation, if it
waits too late in the day, any deterrent value of the referral will be
lost or signiﬁcantly diminished.
Considerations as to Use of the Veto
• Where large-scale atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity are occurring, the Permanent Members of
the Security Council should refrain from use of their veto power,
including, but not limited to, referrals.
Considerations as to Institutional Consistency
• As a policy matter, the Security Council should be concerned about
consistency in making referrals for the sake of its own institutional
credibility, and to show itself as a responsive institution when faced
with mass crimes if they rise to the level of a threat to international
peace and security.
• The Security Council should act as objectively and consistently as
possible in making referrals.
• Consistency in referrals would enhance the deterrent value of the
court.
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Observations as to Referrals to Date
• Under the above criteria, the Darfur and Libya referrals met the
criteria for referral. The criteria would also be met for referring the
situation in Syria. The delay in making a Syria referral harms any
deterrent value that might be derived from referral. The making of
the Libya referral (fairly early on in terms of commission of crimes)
and delay in making a Syria referral and lack of other referrals
suggest a lack of institutional consistency on the part of the
Security Council. The lack of a Syria referral and other referrals (or
other robust action to prevent ongoing crimes) also suggests an
abdication by the Security Council of its responsibility to protect
against large-scale atrocity crimes.
6.2 Deferrals
As to the Security Council’s power to defer situations, the following
observations may be made.
Requirements for Deferral
• The Security Council’s power to make a deferral derives from
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. It must be in response to a threat
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.’
• Rome Statute Article 16 reiterates that the Security Council may
only act pursuant to Chapter VII.
• Rome Statute Article 16 also provides that no ICC investigation or
prosecution’ may be commenced or proceeded with in the event of
deferral. This may impose the requirement that the Security
Council may only defer a particular investigation or prosecution.’
• Rome Statute Article 27 provides that there may be no exemption
from ICC responsibility for certain persons, including government
oﬃcial[s].’
• Other provisions of the Rome Statute, the U.N. Charter, jus co-
gens, customary international law, and treaty obligations may also
be relevant to assessing the validity of a deferral.
Considerations as to Good Policy
• While the Security Council has the power to act in the face of a
threat to the peace,’ it is good policy not to allow a person or state
to beneﬁt from deferral if the person or state created the threat to
the peace.’
JENNIFER TRAHAN470
Observations as to Deferrals to Date
• Under the above criteria, in issuing Resolutions 1422 and 1487,
the Security Council may or may not have acted in response to a
threat to the peace – a threatened withdrawal from peacekeeping
operations. It is also questionable as a policy matter whether a
state making the threat should beneﬁt from such a deferral. It is
unclear whether Rome Statute Article 16 only permits deferral of
an actual investigation or prosecution’ or whether it can be made
proactively to prevent an investigation or prosecution from aris-
ing against a group of persons. Even if Resolutions 1422 and 1487
were properly made in terms of the Security Council’s power, the
Prosecutor and Judges are governed by the Rome Statute, and
Article 27 excludes immunity for government oﬃcials. Additional
legal considerations also suggest the questionable legal validity of
Resolutions 1422 and 1487. At minimum, there is a tension be-
tween the Security Council’s deferral resolutions and the Rome
Statute, as well as other sources of law. Accordingly, there is a
question whether Resolutions 1422 and 1487 were proper Article
16 deferrals.
Observations as to Deferrals Requested
• Under the above criteria, the warrants against Sudanese President
Bashir and investigations and prosecutions against three Kenyan
individuals did not cause any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression that would warrant Chapter VII action.
While the situation in Kenya at various times has threatened or
breached the peace, that resulted from underlying ethnic and
political tensions, not the ICC’s investigation. Even if President
Bashir’s expulsion of humanitarian workers did cause a threat to
peace’ at one point in time, that threat ended and the person
threatening the peace should not be rewarded with deferral of his
or her investigation or prosecution.
6.3 Text of the Referral Resolution
As to the text of the referral resolution:
Funding
• The Security Council should be silent as to funding of the referral,
leaving it to the General Assembly to consider the issue of funding.
Article 17.1 of the U.N. Charter provides that [t]he General
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Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organiza-
tion.’ A question exists whether the Security Council has the
competence to instruct the General Assembly not to fund referrals.
Non-states Parties
• The Security Council should refrain from excluding nationals from
non-State Parties from jurisdiction. Under Rome Statute Article
13(b), the Security Council may refer a situation’ to the ICC. This
language arguably disallows referral of less than a full situation. A
question exists whether troops from non-ICC States Parties may
properly be excluded from referral of the situation’ as they have
been (or purportedly have been) in Resolutions 1593 and 1970. Put
another way, the Security Council likely has power to issue such
exclusions (given its broad Chapter VII powers), but the Prosecu-
tor and Judges take their instructions from the Rome Statute,
which appears to exclude a partial referral. Rome Statute Article 27
(non-immunity as to oﬃcials) may also be relevant, as well as other
Rome Statute provisions and other sources of law.
Severability
• Should the ICC ﬁnd that any of the clauses in Resolutions 1593
and/or 1970 are invalid, it would be preferable for the Court to
interpret those clauses as severable and not treat the entirety of the
referrals as invalid.
Cooperation
• The referral resolution should contain an obligation that all U.N.
Member States cooperate regarding the referred situation, not only
the country at issue.
• It would be useful if the Security Council could provide speciﬁc
steps that a target state should take as to cooperation, rather than
simply obliging the state to cooperate fully with the Court.
• The Security Council could also support non-referred ICC situa-
tions where it is seized with them.
6.4 Follow Up Mechanism for Referrals
As to the need for follow-up to ensure successful investigations and
prosecutions result from Security Council referrals:
• Consideration should be given to creating a follow-up mechanism
after the Security Council makes a referral. One possible model is a
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Security Council working group for ICC referrals,’ similar to the
Security Council working group on Tribunals.
• The Security Council should take consistent action in instances of
non-cooperation
• The ICC should considering going to the U.N. General Assembly if
the Security Council is insuﬃciently responsive to instances of non-
cooperation reported to it.
• The Security Council could harmonize the imposition of sanctions
such as asset freezes and travel bans to automatically cover indi-
viduals subject to ICC indictment.
• Including language in the referral resolution imposing cooperation
obligations on all U.N. Member States regarding the referred sit-
uation would also facilitate follow-up.
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